Populist parties can gain power only by deals with conservatives

The recent electoral advances made by Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) once again show conservative populists are a political force to be reckoned with. They also demonstrate the current limitations of that force if it continues to be primarily a purely oppositional movement.

Conservative populist parties and leaders always draw from the same demographic base: less educated, middle-aged citizens who tend to work with their hands. That was first evident in the United States’ 2016 election, where Donald Trump conquered the Republican Party by drawing on this demographic, and in the United Kingdom’s 2016 Brexit referendum which also surged to victory with these voters.

This model was clearly demonstrated in the recent German state and Austrian elections. The FPÖ, for example, did best with voters aged 35-59, those without an academic secondary school degree (keine Matura), and workers. The AfD in the Brandenburg state election attracted a similar demographic: voters with lower education, those aged 25-59, and workers (Arbeiter). 

These trends are also evident elsewhere in Western Europe. Portugal’s Chega did twice as well among Portuguese without a degree as those with one in March’s election. The Sweden Democrats also performed best with blue-collar workers and the middle-aged in that country’s 2022 vote, and the Swiss People’s Party’s results increased as a voter’s education and income dropped.

Dominating these demographics have catapulted conservative populists into the political conversation everywhere. Depending on the country’s circumstances, populist parties now regularly get between 15 and 30 per cent of a country’s vote. Despite nearly two decades of effort by elites Right and Left to stigmatise populist voters, these parties continue to perform near or at historic highs almost everywhere.

The question for them is no longer whether they can survive. They have shown they can, and in many cases even thrive. The question is whether they can wield serious political influence.

Some parties have done that, but only because they have adapted to their country’s politics. Instead of embracing oppositional politics at every opportunity, they have been willing to compromise and change their rhetoric to become mor acceptable to their nations’ more educated and economically upscale conservatives.

This trend is most evident in Scandinavia. Populist parties in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have all participated in or provided crucial parliamentary support for government led by conventional conservatives. In each case the populist party entered negotiations as if they were a more conventional partner, presenting demands while accommodating those of the other potential partners.

This approach has yielded important gains. The Sweden Democrats pushed their partners to be tougher on crime and migration and also obtained economic concessions for their working-class voters. Denmark’s Danish People’s Party was so successful in pushing tough restrictions on migration that the once-dominant Social Democrats had to adopt similar policies to win back working-class voters. 

This attitude is essential in European nations with proportional representation systems. It is nearly impossible for a single party to win sufficient support to govern alone; every party needs potential partners. That means bending toward more conventional conservatives to entice them into an alliance even as they campaign to attract those parties’ voters.

The Netherlands’ Geert Wilders used this approach to form a four-party government this year after his Freedom Party (PVV) won a shock victory in last year’s vote. He had to give up his ambition to become prime minister and yield many important ministries to other parties. But the PVV sets the tone on migration policy and allows the other parties to obtain things dear to their voters as part of the coalition agreement. The result: the Netherlands’ most conservative government since the Second World War, and consolidation of PVV as the country’s dominant political party in the polls.

Nations with majoritarian election systems, such as France and Italy, force conservative populists to do even more to attract upscale conservatives. Italy’ Georgia Meloni has brought her Brothers of Italy (FdI) party from 4 per cent in 2018 to 26 per cent in the 2022 election, but required an election pact with three other conservative parties because roughly 62 per cent of parliament’s seats are elected using first-past-the-post single-member seats. Her coalition has survived, with FdI increasing its standing to 30 per cent in recent polls.

France’s Marine Le Pen is a textbook example of how a conservative populist can broaden her appeal without abandoning her principles. She finished second in the 2017 presidential vote with a mere 21 per cent primarily on strength from workers and the less educated. Her National Rally party took roughly 33 per cent of the first-round votes in this year’s legislative election. Polls show that this dramatic increase came mainly from the upper socio-economic classes (CSP+), where RN support rose from 15 per cent in 2017 to 25 per cent in 2024, while increasing among the lower classes (CSP-) by a mere percent.

Parties that remain ideologically and demographically pristine can obtain significant numbers of votes. They can obtain significant political power, however, only if they abandon purist approaches for a principled, pragmatic direction.