The fall of Assad: four and a half implications

History is not merely on the move again – as we have become used to saying in response to the great succession of extraordinary political and military events since about 2014-16, that are shattering the old rules and geopolitical status quo – but it is racing forward at a gallop. Over the past couple of weeks it has been events in Syria that have provided the latest shock to the global system, with the swift and sudden implosion of Assad’s regime at the hands of rebels left over from a civil war that the Syrian president had, by all accounts, won four years ago.

It is perhaps too early to identify all the elements involved in this coup de main, and exactly how it was accomplished. One difficulty is that the Syrian rebels are split into a multitude of groups with overlapping loyalties, shifting affiliations and opaque interests; discerning who’s who at any one point, and what their game is, is hard even for the intelligence agencies. Nowhere than in Syria could the expression, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, apply with more reason and effect. 

Another problem is tracking the involvement of foreign state actors within this maze of war and deceit. For over a decade Syria has been an arena of confrontation and occasionally (sometimes simultaneously) cooperation between different combinations of Turkish, Iranian, Russian, Israeli, Gulf Arab and American interests – to name but the most prominent players. Turkey and Israel are by far the biggest beneficiaries of the recent turn of events; any direct role they might have had in covertly enabling aspects of the rebel offensive remains, for now, a mystery.

A few things regarding the final move against Assad are clear enough, though. Leading the charge was Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the successor group to al-Qaeda’s terrorist “affiliate” in Syria, allegedly until 2016. HTS has been at the head of Fatah al-Mubin, a wider coalition of Islamist and secular rebels. On 27 November they suddenly unleashed an impressive, combined-arms blitzkrieg on three axes that took Aleppo within a day. This triggered a chain reaction, where Syrian government forces – Assad’s Syrian Arab Army, the SAA – either ran away or stood down based on secret deals negotiated beforehand, in a very similar way to what happened in Iraq in 2014 with the sudden surge of ISIS. 

The very speed of the surprise rebel advance, and the melting away of the SAA – including coordinated defections – also made it impossible for Assad’s sponsors, chiefly Iran and Russia, to organise an effective response. Iran-backed militias, especially the Syrian wing of Hezbollah, were already weakened by the wider fight against Israel, while the Russians had been drawing down their forces in Syria for a while, to be redeployed to Ukraine. 

Most importantly, Assad’s political credit in Tehran and Moscow had diminished in recent years and months, with his attempts to “normalise” relations with his erstwhile enemies including Turkey – a move that cut against Iranian and Russian interests. Therefore, Assad was quickly deprived both of his own army and of his allies. Within ten days it was all over, with HTS in Damascus and Assad himself fleeing to Russia. What are we to make of all this?

More chaos

In the first place there should be a clear-eyed recognition of the fact that Syria is more likely to relapse into an even darker and more chaotic period of conflict than it experienced during the civil war. The “cautious optimism” displayed in some quarters of Western opinion as to the future of a post-Assad Syria is completely unwarranted. Indeed, it betrays a shocking lack of judgement given that a secular tyrant was replaced by Mohammad al-Jolani, one of Syria’s most brutal terrorists, al-Qaeda “graduate” and former comrade-in-arms of the late Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who ran ISIS. 

If the background of the new ruler of Damascus is not enough to recalibrate expectations away from some version of “democracy” and “stability” imagined by deluded Western minds, one may look to recent regional history and see what happened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam, in Libya after Gaddafi was removed and murdered, and at how Afghanistan turned out. Sudan and Yemen offer further case studies of “rebels” getting the run of the place, and the picture is not pretty.

In Syria, Jolani’s first task will be to consolidate his rule and ensure HTS supremacy among the other jihadis and “rebels” in his coalition – something that becomes even harder at the point of victory when power and the spoils of war have to be shared among such diverse groups. There will also be interference from ex-regime forces and, in time, from Iran which will be looking for a way back to influence in the country (during its brief blitzkrieg HTS struck a deal with Iran, allowing Iranian forces to evacuate). 

Beyond its own client-groups, HTS will also have to contend with rival ones, against which it has done battle before: from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) to the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). ISIS, which in recent months has been giving increasing signs of revival, will also count Jolani as a rival – indeed, a turncoat – despite their shared background. Even without further foreign interference – which, in fact, will inevitably continue and escalate from all sides as Syria is too important to be left to the whims of a jihadist like Jolani – the scene is set for unchecked, bloody infighting among the victors, especially given the power vacuum left by the regime’s implosion.

In terms of theories of “governance”, despite early “assurances” of “inclusivity” given to gullible Western media, HTS and Jolani espouse in fact a mix of nationalism and ISIS-style sharia-based caliphate rule. It is therefore a version of the Taliban model – rather than anything resembling “democracy” – that might obtain in a post-Assad Syria, at least as long and in places where the Islamist militias are in power. Pray for the Christian communities still left in those benighted lands…

Turkish quagmire

The second take-away is that Assad’s fall most probably marks the beginning of an expensive and, likely, self-defeating new adventure for Erdogan’s Turkey. In pursuit of his double aim of destroying the Kurds and building a neo-Ottoman empire, Erdoğan is getting drawn ever deeper into Syria. Turkey has been heavily involved in the civil war since the beginning, and launched a number of military operations into Syria since 2016 – occupying certain border areas as a “security buffer” – looking, at different times, to protect its proxy forces (the SNA) and their influence in Idlib province in particular, to fight ISIS, and to keep the SDF at bay.

The fall of Assad and the resulting power-vacuum is a golden opportunity for Erdoğan, particularly given his allegedly vital role in enabling the HTS takeover. According to reports, Turkish forces and allied militias are building up on the border in the Kobani area for a new offensive into the Kurdish-held part of Syria. Moreover, in recent days Erdoğan has spoken publicly about the post-World War I settlement which saw Ottoman cities like “Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and Raqqa” come under Syrian rule, suggesting – in a thinly-disguised rhetorical manner – that those post-war borders might be revised when “conditions” change.

At present, Turkey appears to have the upper hand in Syria as the only state-level player left with troops on the ground, quite apart from its SNA proxy. Assad’s SAA is no longer a functional military while Israel’s post-Assad opportunistic, free-for-all airstrikes – almost 500 in number, one of the largest IAF campaigns in history – have targeted nearly all of Syria’s now-undefended strategic military infrastructure and heavy equipment, even its navy. Iran’s militia network and influence has been completely annihilated or withdrawn, including the Syrian Hezbollah. The Russians are also packing up. As for the Americans, who operate a “counter-terrorism” force from a few bases in and around Syria, Donald Trump has stated clearly – in capital letters – that “this is not our fight”. Only Israel remains as battle-ready and implacable as ever, having moved to occupy Mount Hermon (a strategic observation post) and a few other buffer zones on the border; but Tel Aviv has no interest in a ground involvement in Syria.

This situation of Turkish ascendancy is unlikely to persist for very long. The shock will wear off, and Iran and others – including ISIS – will find ways to get back into the game. By then, however, the neo-Ottoman mirage will likely have drawn Erdoğan further into the Syrian cauldron. He sprung the trap that got Assad, but the bigger victim in the end might be himself and Turkey’s over-extended ambitions, when events in Syria spiral again out of control – as they surely will, eventually. Erdoğan’s overreach is also putting him and Turkey on a collision course with Israel, a country which has now conclusively demonstrated that it has no military peer in the Middle East, whether technologically or operationally.

Even in the best-case scenario where the Turks and HTS somehow manage to prevent a new civil war – working separately or perhaps sometimes together – the more Turkey gets dragged into Syria the more ruinously expensive this policy will become, and the more difficult it will be, politically, for Erdoğan to reverse course. The Turkish economy has been sputtering for a long time, with inflation at over 47 per cent this November and the lira having lost about 20 per cent of its value just over the past year; a plunge into the Syrian maelstrom might gratify the neo-Ottomans in Ankara, but could also prove fatal to Erdoğan’s regime by the time of the next election in 2028.

Minor Russian setback

Since the collapse of Assad’s regime – and his flight to Moscow as an asylum seeker – the Western press has been rife with jubilant write-ups about the humiliating/devastating “blow” inflicted upon Russia’s prestige, ambitions and global strategic posture. All this is now well within the established narrative pattern in the mainstream media, which always leads with hyperbolic language and erroneous assessments – on most political and strategic topics, but particularly when it comes to Russia – before re-casting the story a few months later when the initial predictions fail to materialise.

There is no doubt that Russia has suffered a setback in Syria, with the loss of a longstanding ally at the hands of rebels that Russian forces have been bombing – on and off – for almost a decade. Assad’s fall appears to entail the end of the Russian presence on Syrian territory at the two bases that the former president had turned over to Putin: the Khmeimim Air Base next to Latakia, and the Tartus Naval Base. 

Russian troops and equipment spread at different locations across Syria are now being convoyed to these two bases. This is presumably a step towards full evacuation by sea and air; but, as things stand, Moscow is still negotiating terms with the provisional HTS authorities in Damascus. It is not impossible that the Russians will strike some kind of deal to retain one or both of those bases, not least since they are subject of a formal lease treaty ratified by the (previous) Syrian government. But at present the assumption is that this is the end of Russia’s military outpost in Syria – which they have had, in a much reduced form at only Tartus, since Soviet times.

The loss of Tartus and Khmeimim would indeed complicate Russia’s strategy in the Middle East and especially in Africa. Apart from their operational role in Russia’s military campaign within Syria in support for Assad, these bases have functioned, jointly, as a key logistical hub and stopover point supporting Russian military activities (conducted mainly via PMCs or Private Military Contractors like the Wagner Group) in Africa. The latter have now expanded across the Sahel, as well as taking in the older Russian involvement in Libya and places like Sudan. 

It is assumed that Russian forces in these far-off conflicts would be near-impossible to supply without the ability to refuel and refit ships and aircraft in Syria. But things are not so clear-cut; Russia still has other options, and can create more; although all of these would be inferior and more expensive than operating from Tartus and Khmeimim. 

Russian ships could pull in at the port of Tobruk in eastern Libya which is controlled by Khalifa Haftar, a Moscow ally who relies on Russian military hardware and who has been negotiating a naval base access with the Russians for a while. Another alternative could be Port Sudan on the Red Sea, although a 2020 Russian-Sudanese deal over the specifics of a military naval base has been complicated by the local civil war. A more outlandish and speculative option would be to aim for a foothold in Djibouti – perhaps even using China’s base there, at first – thus allowing Russia to supply its Africa enterprises through a new eastern route via the Indian Ocean and Iran.

Beyond this, Russia would almost certainly look to BRICS fellow-members Egypt – where the Russian’s are building the country’s first nuclear power plant – and South Africa for naval base access agreements, or equivalent deals. Finally, the actual logistical requirements for Russian operations in Africa should be scrutinised more closely, given that Russian regular military presence – as opposed to PMCs – is rather limited, with upper estimates of 3,000 troops. In these circumstances, many logistical and supply requirements could – and certainly are – met via commercial contractors. The idea that Russia’s strategic efforts in Africa will collapse or even be significantly impaired purely as a result of the loss of Tartus and Khmeimim is attractive, but most likely misguided.

As for Russia’s alleged loss of “prestige” over the fall of Assad, this likewise appears as an over-estimation upon closer examination. The fact is that Russia had already proven its credentials as a staunch and effective ally when by deploying a major expeditionary force at great risk from 2015 onwards and helping Assad save his regime in the first place. In that respect, objectively speaking, Russia upheld its side of the bargain. The 2020 Idlib ceasefire agreement, signed in Moscow by Putin and Erdoğan, had de facto ended the major fighting in the conflict, and was almost universally perceived as marking Assad’s victory. 

The fact that this wasn’t enough to secure the Ba’athist regime is another matter, and it’s not on Russia. Assad won the war but lost the peace: in the years since, his regime became only more corrupt and was unable to consolidate its battlefield success either politically or economically. Diplomatically, Assad had begun flirting with his erstwhile enemies, particularly the Turk. It is also the case that Russia has had to prioritise its own war in Ukraine, reducing its Syrian military footprint. All things considered, therefore, it is not at all clear whether the collapse of Assad’s house of cards will be judged by others among Russia’s friends as a failure by Moscow rather than what it really was – firstly the responsibility of Assad himself, and then secondly of Iran.

To these two points of doubt that may be levelled, with reason, against the notion that the Syrian affair is a Russian “disaster”, we may add a third of an indirect and positive nature – positive, unfortunately, for Russia. And that is precisely the fact described in the preceding section: Turkey’s deepening involvement in the shifting sands of Syrian affairs. The more Erdoğan gets stuck into his neo-Ottoman project in Syria down south, and the more trouble the Turks get into as things take a turn for the worse (which they will), the less leverage will Turkey will have in the north where it faces Russia in the Black Sea area and on the Ukrainian issue. 

As Edward Luttwak famously noted, the logic of strategy is paradoxical. This is most readily seen even in clichés like, “if you want peace, prepare for war”, or in the security dilemma where one’s increased strength provokes fear and escalation in the other, leading to more insecurity. The paradoxical logic of strategy can, therefore, be said to be at play in Syria in Russia’s favour. Assad’s fall frees Moscow of the Syrian entanglement – which did not seem to have been of particular value lately – and at the same time it ties down Ankara. In this context, Russia’s leverage on Turkey can be expected to grow in step with the growing chaos coming to Syria.

Lesson for Ukraine

A fourth take-away from the Syrian events is the sharp two-part lesson they hold for Ukraine. Caution is, of course, advised in reading insights across from one very different context to another – but since here we have two contemporaneous events involving some similar actors and dynamics, it is worth making the point.

For the first part, Assad’s fate has been a live illustration of the risk of relying on foreign sponsors for help over the long term, especially after the “war” – in this case, primarily Iran and its proxy groups including Hezbollah, but also Russia. Assad won his initial victory with Russo-Iranian allied help, over many years, and perhaps forgot just how weak his own regime would be if left to fend for itself. He certainly seems not to have understood the underlying change in the capacity of both Iranian and Russian assets still deployed in Syria to help him in a crisis. He got complacent, took his sponsors for granted, and when a revived enemy struck he went down like a lead balloon.

Ukraine faces the same risk. The country is completely dependent on its sponsors – both militarily in terms of equipment, but especially financially – and could not fight this war on its own for more than a few months. Ukraine’s own war-making capacity as it stood in February 2022 has been destroyed several times over by Russia, but, due to constant Western resupply this fact has not registered properly. Russia’s own military machine has had to be regenerated at much the same rate or faster, but this has been done largely through domestic financial, technological and manufacturing efforts, aided by some imports of key components. The image of the brave Ukrainian troops fighting with valour in the trenches is genuine and praiseworthy; the notion that Ukraine itself, purely on its own, can face up to the enemy, is almost as hollow and misleading as what Assad might have thought of his own regime before the axe came down. 

Equally important is the significance of the fact that the Syrian regime’s fall happened four years into a ceasefire that had de facto ended the war. In that time his allies’ support was drained of substance as they prioritised other crises, so that only a hollow shell was left by the end. Again, this speaks to the risks for Ukraine even – or especially – after an eventual ceasefire with Russia.

The second part of what can be learned for Ukraine from the Syrian affair is the extent to which pragmatism and Realpolitik can stretch when higher interests demand it. This is best seen in the rush, among almost all key Western players to signal a willingness to “work with” arch-terrorist al-Jolani, and to lift the terrorist designation from HTS, now that they’ve got power in Damascus. For years the US authorities have had a $10 million bounty on the head of HTS’s chief jihadist. If this is possible with respect to Jolani, many will ask, then why not with Putin? 

As the prospect of negotiations with Russia appears to some to draw near, unpleasant compromises will be required and “morals” will sometimes have to be left to the side. At least in Syria the self-righteous statesmen of the “free world” are showing that they have not completely lost their sense of pragmatism and rank hypocrisy – both, essential qualities in successful negotiations.

Europe sidelined

Finally, by way of half of lesson from Syria, spare a thought for the hapless Europeans – those west of Ukraine – a continent utterly drained of martial spirit and of the will to resist even the waves of untold numbers of third-world migrants. Completely dependent on the US for the sustainment of NATO and of Ukraine’s war effort, and completely unable and unwilling to mobilise and rearm itself properly, even almost in the 4th year of a gigantic war on its own soil, Europe appears as nothing more than a fat goose awaiting its plucking at the hands of its enemies, once they’re in a position to directly call our bluff. 

In Syria, as in Africa and to a large extent in Ukraine (where everything ultimately depends on the US), Europe is nothing but a spectator to events and an object of history rather than its subject. Deprived of hard power and the ability to act, and ailing from its own self-inflicted economic wounds while struggling to carry on its back the vast, perversely-generous welfare states of its wealthy nations, Europe’s foreign policy role is reduced to being just a cash-cow for the rest of the world, in the form of “aid”. 

This was precisely the EU’s first reaction to Jolani’s terrorists taking control of Damascus: the female duo that now calls the bloc’s foreign policy shots, von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas, rushed to call for direct contacts with the Jolani jihadis and to promise them – what else – lots of EU taxpayers’ money in “humanitarian aid”. Quite apart from this, another €1 billion bribe has also just been handed over to Erdoğan by von der Leyen who also had to go to Ankara herself for the privilege. This spectacle of European impotence and naivety, meekly offering money in the hope of buying some influence in the region, and playing out on the blood-stained stage of Syria where hardcore, ruthless war leaders roam, is more than dispiriting – it is tragic. 

To conclude, a historic event like the sudden evaporation of an entire, longstanding tyrannical – though hollow – regime such as Syria’s offers a plethora of insights and teachings for the future, even at first sight. In time we will learn more about the more detailed aspects of exactly how this complete reset of a key geopolitical flashpoint was accomplished. By the same token, we must hope that in time we will also understand better and with more precision the forces that plunged Syria into civil war in the first place, during the Arab Spring, and then influences behind the original rise of ISIS in neighbouring Iraq. We might not like or even believe what should be revealed…

For now, history is our best guide for the future, and the history of similar events in recent times – like Libya or Iraq – is not encouraging. Syria appears destined only for more war and destruction, and many of its people may come to regret Assad despite all his crimes, as is sometimes the case with Gaddafi and other tyrants. It is one of the tragedies of history that “liberation” often turns out to be worse than what preceded it; and in an area of apocalyptic jihad and civil war butchery that has seen so many atrocities, we should expect evil to be at a clear advantage against any attempts to bring peace or stability. Only the dead have seen the end of war.