Europe: checkmate

This year will see the 80th anniversary of VE Day, i.e. Victory in Europe over Nazi Germany in May 1945. It is a neat marker for the end of wider Europe’s centuries-long role as a locus of geopolitical power, and, in the guise of the EEC/EU, as a somewhat significant collective actor in world affairs. The decline has been evident for many years but has recently accelerated. Now, with the Ukraine endgame rapidly resetting the balance of power, all the cherished illusions of the deluded European globalist elites are evaporating into thin air. Europe’s complete strategic bankruptcy, impotence and irrelevance are being revealed on a historic scale in a humiliating but inevitable fashion as the comfortable politics of righteousness give way to hard-nosed Realpolitik. 

It may be countered that it is too early to draw such conclusions. After all, a peace deal is still far off; talks have barely begun, and it is not inconceivable that president Trump might yet realise, as this column has consistently argued in the past, that it is in America’s interest to contain Russia and maintain a strong defensive posture in Europe. 

Aside from this, new factors might come into play as regards the US-Russia talks. Turkey is already indicating it wants to have a say, and Erdogan has a variety of options to exercise his leverage. China, too, has a huge interest in how an eventual peace deal looks like, and will certainly seek to influence the outcome directly or indirectly. 

But all these potential developments are speculative, and even if they do come to pass it will be too late. A new geopolitical reality, a new world, has already been born. Its founding moment was the coming together of the American and Russian delegations in Riyadh on Tuesday to begin peace talks on the largest inter-state war in Europe since WWII in the absence of either Ukraine or any European representatives. 

As if to leave no doubt about the scope and range of this epochal reset that is now fast underway, Secretary Rubio explicitly referred, after the meeting, to “incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians geopolitically on issues of common interest and, frankly, economically on issues that hopefully will be good for the world and also improve our relations in the long term.” 

In practical terms, there is hardly anything that can now remedy or delete the global significance of Russia joining the United States, on an equal footing, to settle the world’s greatest current military crisis. This principle is now established, and Russia’s status as a great power – the pursuit of which has been the centrepiece of Vladimir Putin’s career – has now been formally recognised by the US. 

Many observers will sneer at this, as they have, foolishly, throughout the conflict, at Russia’s capacity to wage war and at its overall performance. But a great part of the rest of the world – especially the Global South – will take careful note of Moscow’s achievements and, as they’ll see it, surging diplomatic and political “prestige”. This, again, only compounds the geopolitical challenges for the broader West going forward.

For Europe, the scale of the complete failure of its Ukraine policy cannot be understated. Indeed, it cannot yet be even fully comprehended. The original goal was that “Putin must lose”. Europe bet everything on this, even though it was not a party to the conflict.

To its credit, Europe – chiefly the UK – alongside the US, immediately set out to assist Ukraine’s heroic defence with military and financial aid, as normal and required under such circumstances. Working together with the Biden Administration in the US, the Europeans also took direct action against Russia by seizing Russian foreign exchange reserves and imposing sanctions not just on the state but on individuals. Eventually the military policy escalated to providing Ukraine with weapons and assistance to attack Russian territory. 

From our Western perspective, all this has been of course entirely justified – certainly on moral grounds, but also purely as a matter of policy. From the beginning it was determined, rightly, that allowing Russia to destroy and occupy parts or all of Ukraine would mean the end of the “rules-based international order”, and would “reward aggression” – thus opening the door to more war. 

Strategically, support for Ukraine soon came to be seen as a way to destroy Russia itself, by having its military machine ground to dust by Kyiv’s forces (supplied by the West), and its economy devastated by sanctions and the cost of war. The clear European end goal was to neutralise the Russian threat for good, and – it was hoped – to trigger regime change in Moscow. Even the dismemberment of Russia was openly discussed in public media. 

As the war progressed, the generally accepted goals (the West has never actually articulated a theory of victory) seemed to change, from destroying Russian power to containing it by means of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – and, eventually, perhaps through Ukraine’s integration into NATO.

The point in recalling these facts is to help explain the enormous stakes involved in Europe’s Ukraine policy from 2022 onwards. The risk that Putin would win, rather than lose, was never truly accounted for – and understandably so, since Europe perhaps could and should only have acted as it did. 

Putin hasn’t won yet, but he’s firmly on that track now, given the progress of the Russian forces in the field and the change in US policy. Even a pull-out of US troops from post-2000 NATO territories (a key Russian demand in 2021, laughed at, at the time) is now being openly considered in some quarters. 

One consequence of the war and the way it has proceeded is that Russia is now certain to do everything in its power to take advantage of its aftermath. It sees Europe as an active existential enemy to an arguably unprecedented degree and no détente with Russia is likely possible for a generation – if anyone were even willing to pursue one. But, then, what is the option, post-Ukraine? Continued confrontation? Is that feasible?

Europe’s Ukraine (or, seen from the other end, Russian) policy, which depends on the US, is certainly in free-fall. This is not simply about military aid to Ukraine, the most important components of which – from Patriot systems to space-based intelligence and communications – are American. In theory the Europeans could eventually substitute almost all classes of US military equipment provided to Ukraine, and even do it in sufficient numbers. Of course, the equipment issue is somewhat secondary at this point, given that Ukraine’s difficulties at the front are primarily due to manpower shortages rather than lack of weapons or ammunition.

The real issue for Europe is not how to continue supporting Ukraine’s fight – but how to keep NATO alive and Article 5 credible. The political breakdown in trans-Atlantic relations – over things from Greenland and tariffs to the points raised by JD Vance in Munich – is now so serious that the credibility of future US military support for Europe in case of a future war or escalation is now severely dented. 

NATO deterrence requires rock-solid confidence in an allied response, especially from the US. Given US Defense Secretary Hegseth’s recent remarks that the clock is ticking on the US military presence in Europe, and given the absolutely clear message from the White House that Europe must assume responsibility for its own defence, that confidence is evaporating rather quickly. 

There is no need to wait until US troops physically withdraw from the continent in order to confirm this point; the political signal regarding America’s unwillingness to continue supporting European deterrence – let alone to actually fight for Europe if needed – has already been given. It is now a matter of political interpretation as to exactly how US would react in a NATO crisis in the meantime, but the safe assumption must be, as mentioned, that the game is up.

It is, therefore, rather curious that the European defence debate is remains focused on how to continue backing the Ukraine – including unrealistic discussions of European deployments in that country – when the much bigger problem of NATO deterrence and, essentially, that of Europe’s own defence, has now come to the fore in such a dramatic fashion. Indeed, protecting the NATO territory should be the main priority of every Allied government. 

What is worse is that there is hardly any European talk on the specific requirements of securing Europe without US help in the (possibly near) future. As I have previously suggested in these pages, an adequate European-only defence that can achieve rough parity with a future Russian threat post-Ukraine will likely require, very roughly, standing up at least 20 new fully equipped brigades, plus a rigorous programme of upgrading and exercising the existing c.113 national brigades belonging to the various European countries (assuming they would all be sent to the front in an emergency). 

The oft-repeated fallacy of Europe’s “combined” superiority in defence spending and overall numbers compared to Russia is just that; in reality most of those existing c.113 European brigades are not at all what they seem on paper, and many belong to countries far removed from the problems of the Eastern Flank. Even a country like Romania, a frontline state which would be expected to take defence seriously, effectively lies about its manning levels and its reserve structures, often taking soldiers from multiple other units in order to man detachments sent to participate in NATO training exercises.

The scale of the Ukraine war, and of the military machine built by Russia – which continues to expand, possibly well beyond 200 brigades – does not quite reflect properly in our debates. The practical defence requirements against that kind of force are vast, especially for a European continent averse to martial values, with an emasculated, mollycoddled population almost entirely unfamiliar with the phenomenon of war, and facing huge social, industrial and broader economic pressures. There is much talk of “higher defence spending” and “increased armaments production” – but very little understanding of what it actually takes, in time, effort and resources (human and material), to create actual combat capabilities rather than battalions on paper. 

As things stand, the European defence conversation is almost entirely unmoored from reality, and when it does touch on some of the more specific aspects of that reality, it tends to ignore the timeline. Russia has built a war machine backed by a war economy, which exist now, in the present, albeit they’re not in the best shape after the exertions of the Ukraine campaign. But one or two years of “peace” with Ukraine, likely with the benefit of sanctions relief, will restore Russia’s warfighting capacity to a significant degree. Meanwhile, the Europeans talk about what they might be able to assemble in terms of continental defence sometime in the future. The most adventurous even talk, brazenly, of sending troops into Ukraine when recruitment figures in their home countries keep falling year after year.

The incontrovertible fact is that Europe’s geostrategic situation – to include its security architecture – has de facto imploded, or is in the process of doing so. The full effects and implications of this, the dimensions of the disaster and risks going forward, are not yet apparent – just as the scene of a collapsed building remains covered in clouds of dust for a while, after the event. 

But soon enough the dust will settle and the consequences of Europe’s arrogance, hubris and sheer incompetence – a collection of countries that never took defence seriously after the Cold War and preferred to indulge in welfarism, moral disarmament and postmodern ideological self-destruction, and utterly misjudged its enemies – will become fully apparent. 

Some countries will realise sooner than others that America’s turning away from his continent is a terminal event for Europe’s old pretences and assumptions. Some will understand that a completely new approach to international politics and questions of strategic policy is required, and they will adapt, and win. Others will continue chasing after illusions, remaining stuck in the past, and will lose. There is no apocalypse coming; the sky will not be falling on Europe. But it will be a very different world.