Of all of President Trump’s social media posts, it is the one he fired off on Tuesday that future historians may pick as marking the biggest turning point of the Ukraine war. As Trump tweets go – and his inimitable impromptu “communiqués” have long become an established genre of themselves – this one was an instant classic for its U-turn shock factor, the plurality of serious underlying messages it packed, its revealing effect on his critics, and the balance of its contradictions.
The Ukrainians, the president said to the surprise of the entire world, can “WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form” and indeed “maybe even go further than that”. Russia, in his newfound analysis, looks like “a paper tiger” that “has been fighting aimlessly” since 2022 and whose economy is in “BIG” trouble. Now, Trump suggested, “is the time for Ukraine to act”, while promising that he will continue to “supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them” – before wishing “both Countries well” and “Good luck to all”.
To say that this is – for the moment – a complete transformation in presidential rhetoric on the Ukrainian war would almost be an understatement in these circumstances. Such declarations don’t just go against Trump’s long-held, oft-repeated and well-established view on the conflict, with a weak Ukraine seen as losing “badly” and a powerful Russia on an implacable course to victory. But they would have been utterly inconceivable just a few weeks ago when the mainstream foreign policy community was left aghast at Trump’s apparent validation of Russian power at the Alaska Summit, and his dim view of the Ukrainian cause.
So what is going on? There are three possibilities. The first is that Donald Trump has experienced a genuine Damascene conversion. Secondly, this might just be another impulsive, ill-informed, “nonsensical” outburst by the President, soon to be written off by some further development and twist in his perspective on the subject. Thirdly, and more likely, Tuesday’s tweet is in fact a more calculated political move signalling a change in policy but wrapped in wording designed to cushion the impact and control the narrative in his favour.
The idea that the US President has truly changed his mind on the conflict is not tenable because the ostensible reasons for this switch are not credible. In his tweet, Trump himself suggested that he has only now got to “fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation”. Claiming, as US Commander in Chief, a previous lack of knowledge about what’s going on is as “believable” as the earlier episode in September when the President declared himself “shocked” that the Europeans were still buying oil from Russia – an otherwise widely known fact which he himself had already condemned a full six months ago in Congress.
Nor can anyone be seriously expected to believe that Trump suddenly thinks Russia is a “paper tiger” because it hasn’t won the war in a week. It’s the kind of notion that wins praise in the more extreme NAFO-type circles who have always pushed it as part of the Allied information warfare against Russia, and which has even deeper roots in neocon imaginings of Russia as merely a “gas station with nukes”.
If Russia really is a paper tiger, why does NATO need to spend 5 per cent on defence to rearm on a vast scale, and what accounts for the allied concerns over the presumptive future Russian invasion of Europe? The fact is that everyone involved, including Donald Trump, understands that Russian military power – including its nuclear component – is not just very considerable, but that it is expanding even as the war continues.
Rather than indicating a change of heart, and even less a random tirade – the post has too much substance and is too well judged politically for that – the real message of Trump’s tweet seems to be that he has now had enough of this war and is washing his hands of it.
The evidence is clear. To start with, the president’s tweet unequivocally places the responsibility for both financial and military support for Ukraine solely in the hands of the EU and NATO, warns that it will all require “time and patience”. The context matters here as well, with this Tuesday tweet coming, as it did, against the background of Trump’s request that Europe cease all purchases of oil and gas from Russia. The even broader context is, of course, America’s grand strategic retrenchment and re-focus on its own hemisphere which requires winding down commitments in both Europe and Asia.
The other key point in the tweet is when Trump even says, effectively, that the US will keep selling weapons to European NATO countries but will have no part in any of the military decision-making related to their employment. This is not Trump giving the Europeans a “free hand” against Russia, but Trump taking his hands off the entire affair and telling the Europeans they’re on their own. It’s hardly good news for Europe.
As to the other points that have excited the imagination of the European strategic community, to do with Trump’s apparent appreciation of Ukraine’s chances and Russia’s troubles, the thing that everyone seems to be missing is just how hedged and qualified the president’s language is here.
Liberate the whole of Ukraine? It’s an “option”, says Trump, who even adds the rhetorical tell-tales of fantastical propositions: “Why not?” and “who knows?”. The Russian military? He never actually says Russia “is” a paper tiger, only that it “looks like” one, and that its performance in the field has not been “distinguishing”. The mention that Russia has been fighting “aimlessly” in Ukraine – a patently false statement – only serves to underline the strong sense that much of Trump’s commentary on the situation is intentionally flippant and intended to placate his critics now that his policy has changed, while avoiding any seriously offensive rhetoric against the Russians.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the President’s statement is not the de facto announcement of his own stepping back from the war, but the very public exhortation for Ukraine “to act”. This is not a suggestion for more military action – Ukraine is already doing everything it can – but, almost certainly, a renewed call for diplomacy.
Trump’s veiled final advice to Ukraine, as he appears to bow out of this conflict, seems to be, implicitly, to recognise that it now has a (perhaps short) new window of opportunity to seek some compromise peace with Russia – before Putin stabilises his economy again, and before the political-military effects of the American step-back are fully felt. Of course, there will be no compromise, as the war-parties in both Europe and Russia remain in charge of events, and the only pro-peace player in the game, Donald Trump, is done with all this. “Good luck to all”, indeed.
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