Twenty years ago, Ahmad al-Shara — once known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani — was locked up at the US-run Camp Bucca in Iraq, branded a terrorist and an enemy of the West for his role in al-Qaeda.
On Monday, he walked into the White House, the first Syrian president ever formally received there, as part of President Donald Trump’s new Middle East initiative. His visit marks Syria’s shift into the American orbit following the fall of the Assad regime and the retreat of Russian and Iranian influence. From prisoner to president, al-Shara’s journey reflects not just a personal transformation but a turning point in the Middle East’s geopolitical order: The United States as hegemon, Gulf monarchies operating under its protection, US adversaries marginalised, and European states side-lined, lacking a shared agenda and acting only within Washington’s framework.
Al-Shara has emerged as a central player in Washington’s strategy to expand its influence, with the goal of securing broader recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Analysts believe the White House sees him as pivotal to a larger plan: Extending the Abraham Accords, the US-brokered deals that normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states. “This has not been officially announced, but it is clear that Trump’s aim is to include Syria in the Abraham Accords,” says Mauro Primavera, a researcher on Syrian studies at the University of Milan. “Syria is strategically located in the Levant, linking Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean, and its alignment prevents destabilisation and external influence, particularly from Iran-linked groups. Devastated by war, Syria also becomes a hub for joint reconstruction ventures between American companies and Gulf states.”
Before Syria can formally join the accords, several steps are under consideration: Damascus joining the international coalition against ISIS — paradoxical, given ISIS grew from an al-Qaeda offshoot once led by al-Shara — a gradual easing of US sanctions, and the establishment of a permanent American base near Damascus. The base would serve as a deterrent and insurance against hostilities that might derail a Syrian–Israeli rapprochement.
US leadership has reduced European countries to marginal actors. Primavera explains: “Unlike the Europeans, Washington can, through its military presence and partnerships with Gulf states, offer a comprehensive regional deal guaranteeing political stability and economic agreements, ensuring al-Shara’s survival in a fragile Syria fragmented by decades of war. Europeans lack this power and, crucially, a shared policy on Syria. Their agendas are often divergent or even competing.”
This fragmentation is evident in the rivalry between France and Italy. Paris has maintained a hard-line stance against Assad, pursuing legal cases linked to his regime. Rome, by contrast, reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2024, becoming the first European country to do so — a pragmatic move that drew sharp criticism from Paris. European attempts to engage al-Shara individually had little impact; his first international trip as president was to Washington, not Paris, Berlin, or Brussels. Primavera notes: “Europeans can act on economic aid, human rights, or specific dossiers, but Syria needs an overarching agreement to secure its leadership and stability — something only the US can provide.”
Today, decisions shaping the next chapter of the Middle East are being made in Washington, not Europe. Under Trump, they align closely with the vision of the Abraham Accords. Few could have imagined that a former al-Qaeda commander would one day emerge as a US-backed president, playing a central role in facilitating Israel’s integration into the region.
