Switzerland has taken a historic step away from its traditionally restrictive stance on arms exports.
The Swiss Parliament yesterday approved measures allowing the government — Switzerland’s seven-member executive cabinet — to authorise weapons sales to countries involved in armed conflicts. That will depend on whether ministers judge that such exports do not endanger Swiss neutrality, foreign policy or national security.
The move paves the way for deeper Swiss integration into Europe’s rapidly expanding defence ecosystem, but it also raises new questions about the potential use of its weapons in Ukraine and, consequently, about Switzerland’s role as a potential mediator in the conflict.
Just as significant is the abolition of Switzerland’s long-standing ban on re-exports.
For years, foreign buyers were required to sign “no re-export” declarations preventing Swiss-made components from reaching third countries without Bern’s explicit consent.
This stance reflected a certain reading of Switzerland’s long-standing neutrality — one that favoured keeping the country at arm’s length from conflicts, even indirectly, in order to safeguard its credibility and effectiveness as a diplomatic mediator.
That clause has now been scrapped, effectively weaving the Swiss defence sector into the European Union’s supply chains at a moment when the continent is racing to rearm.
The timing is no coincidence. Spurred by the prospect of prolonged confrontation with Moscow, EU governments are pouring billions into expanding industrial capacity and securing reliable supply lines.
Switzerland, although outside the EU, has been steadily drawn into this dynamic. In June, the Federal Council unveiled the country’s first-ever armaments policy strategy, emphasising industrial consolidation, deeper international co-operation and stable access to critical technologies. Yesterday’s decision aligns Swiss policy closely with those goals: Bern intends to embed its defence industry within Europe’s broader security infrastructure.
The political question overshadowing the reform is whether it could allow Swiss equipment to reach Ukrainian forces fighting Russia.
Until now, Switzerland had carefully maintained a role as a potential neutral mediator: It aligned with European sanctions against Russia but refrained from authorising any transfer of weapons, keeping itself less directly involved in the conflict than other European countries.
In December 2024, Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis held a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during which they discussed the war and Switzerland’s forthcoming chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). According to the Russian side, the call focused on Switzerland’s stance on the conflict and its proposal to help facilitate mediation.
Cassis has since reiterated that Switzerland is “more than ready” to host a peace summit between Russia and Ukraine — potentially in Geneva. He also suggested that the country could grant immunity to key figures, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, to encourage Moscow’s participation.
The new legal framework, though, subtly shifts Switzerland’s position. Without the re-export ban, EU countries or other buyers could transfer Swiss materiel to Kyiv without Bern’s approval. While Switzerland would still not deliver weapons directly, the possibility of its arms reaching Ukraine now exists indirectly.
This raises a delicate tension: Moscow could interpret Switzerland’s new policy as a sign of deeper involvement against Russia, potentially undermining the country’s credibility as a neutral mediator and complicating its traditional role as a bridge for dialogue.
At home, the reform has reignited Switzerland’s perennial debate over neutrality. Supporters argue that neutrality must adapt to a radically changed strategic environment — and that integration with Europe’s defence framework does not threaten the country’s independent foreign policy.
Critics, including peace groups and human-rights organisations, warn that the changes jeopardise Switzerland’s international reputation as a principled neutral actor. They fear Swiss weapons could ultimately appear in conflict zones marked by serious violations of humanitarian law.
Switzerland has not abandoned neutrality. But yesterday’s move marks a decisive shift toward a more flexible interpretation — one that binds the country more closely to Europe’s coordinated rearmament drive.
The country’s defence industry now sits firmly within Europe’s evolving military landscape, with implications that will echo from Brussels to Moscow.
