At the beginning of December, Bulgaria witnessed the largest social mobilisation in decades. On December 1, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Sofia, with mass demonstrations also unfolding in Plovdiv, Varna, and other cities across the country. What began as opposition to the 2026 state budget quickly escalated into a nationwide revolt against the government and the capture of the state by oligarchic networks.
The coalition government led by Prime Minister Rosen Zhelazkov, based on the centre-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), lost its ability to govern under the pressure of continuous street protests. In mainstream Western media, these events were often framed as a “pro-European uprising”, implying that the streets rose in defence of Bulgaria’s EU integration. This interpretation not only oversimplifies reality but actually misrepresents the protests’ purpose. At their core, the protests were driven by mounting frustration over corruption, clientelism, and elite impunity—problems that have persisted alongside formal European integration for years.
The immediate catalyst for the crisis was the 2026 budget proposal. It marked a clear departure from Bulgaria’s previously relatively conservative fiscal approach. The government proposed substantial salary increases in the public sector—well above private-sector wage growth—while simultaneously raising taxes and contributions for businesses and employees.
In a country long struggling with politicised administration and clientelism, these proposals were not seen as development-oriented policies but rather as an attempt to further cement structures loyal to those in power. Critics argued that the additional funds would flow to inefficient institutions, strengthening personal and political dependency networks. The budget thus became a symbol of a much larger issue: A system entrenched enough to survive repeated elections and government changes.
Since 2020, Bulgaria has held seven early parliamentary elections. The ongoing instability was not the result of “democratic chaos,” but of the inability to break through the same entrenched networks that had operated for years under the umbrella of European tolerance.
The anger of the protesters coalesced around two figures, who have come to embody the pathologies of Bulgaria’s political system: Boyko Borissov and Delyan Peevski.
Borissov, the GERB leader and three-time prime minister between 2009 and 2021, has been a central figure in Bulgarian politics for nearly two decades. He cultivated an image as a guarantor of stability and a “strong state”, yet his administrations were consistently tainted by allegations of ties to organised crime, misuse of EU funds, and undermining judicial independence. Despite numerous scandals, European institutions’ responses remained remarkably restrained for years. Borissov actively pushed for Bulgaria’s entry into the eurozone.
Even more emblematic of state capture is Delyan Peevski—a media oligarch and politician sanctioned by both the United States and the United Kingdom for major corruption. Despite international restrictions, his political network provided crucial parliamentary support to GERB governments. For protesters, Peevski was a clear sign that the state had been colonised by oligarchic interests operating above the law and beyond accountability.
The slogans chanted on Sofia’s streets—“Mafia out!” and “Borissov and Peevski, go!”—expressed opposition not only to specific individuals but also to the entire model of governance. Bulgarian flags dominated the protests, signalling the demand to reclaim control over the state.
Contrary to attempts to impose an external narrative, the December protests were not pro-EU. EU symbols appeared only marginally at mass gatherings. Occasional EU flags, sporadically seen on the fringes, had no bearing on the overall message. Yet some Western commentators built a narrative around these incidental images, portraying the events as a defence of Bulgaria’s EU course.
The paradox is clear: The government ousted by the protests was one of the most loyal to Brussels in the entire region. GERB has long been a member of the European People’s Party, and Borissov was considered a reliable partner in European capitals—pro-NATO and consistently pushing integration objectives.
In 2025, Bulgaria saw mobilisations from various, often socially and politically disparate, groups—from anti-corruption movements to electorates sceptical of the euro. These groups shared no common ideological or party identity, yet they were united by a single experience: Opposition to a system of power devoid of accountability, real social oversight, and capacity for self-correction.
December’s demonstrations were therefore not a simple continuation of earlier protests in 2025, organised, for example, by the right-wing Vazrazhdane party against planned euro adoption. Those earlier mobilisations focused primarily on economic sovereignty and fears of inflation. The December uprising, however, had a broader systemic character—it brought together actors who had previously protested for entirely different reasons but ultimately reached the same conclusion: The state had ceased to function in the public interest.
An often-overlooked element of the December protests was the role of the younger generation, particularly Gen Z. Young Bulgarians formed a visible component of the street mobilisation, actively using social media to organise demonstrations outside traditional party structures. This was not an ideological or identity-driven mobilisation but a pragmatic response to daily experience of an ineffective state, colonised by oligarchic networks and detached from society’s real needs.
This stance did not imply blind allegiance to any international actor or selection of an alternative “camp”. Rather, it represented a conscious rejection of binary logic, in which any challenge to the prevailing integration model is automatically labelled disloyal. For Bulgarians—as for many societies in Central and Eastern Europe—the core value remains the ability to shape domestic policy independently, without an external protective umbrella for local oligarchs.
Despite Bulgaria’s declared loyalty to Brussels, the country remains one of the most corrupt in the EU. Rule-of-law mechanisms are applied selectively by the EU: Countries deemed “problematic” face harsh reactions primarily for political or ideological violations (e.g., Hungary), while thriving corruption and systemic pathologies in “loyal” states like Bulgaria have been tolerated for years, even legitimised by EU support. Borissov’s close ties with European leaders, maintained even amid mass protests, have become a symbol of this double standard.
The crisis unfolds just weeks before Bulgaria’s planned euro adoption on January 1, 2026. In this context, the irony is bitter: Elites push for deeper integration as a marker of success, while citizens—in the largest mobilisation in decades, sparked initially by budget opposition—loudly demand a state that actually works.
These protests expose how European integration increasingly diverges from its stated goals. Integration, instead of driving real reform, has become a mechanism to stabilise the status quo—conditional on political loyalty to the Brussels establishment. The streets made it clear: Bulgarians are not demanding ideology but a functioning state, with equality before the law, accountable governance, and no structural protection for oligarchic networks.
December’s events also demonstrate that so-called “pro-European” protests are no longer automatically “pro-EU”. No narrative can alter the fact that citizens increasingly recognise the gap between declared values and political practice, and they expect a return to genuine European principles—even as the European Union, as an institutional project, increasingly abandons them.
The only way out may be revolutionary thinking