Europe is not re-arming: It’s a fraud, a fake and a lie

Listen, Fritz. The deal is we look sincere, point the gun, say 'bang', and that is enough to fool the Americans. (Photo by Hesham Elsherif/Getty Images)

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Europe is back.

At least, that’s the message Europeans brought to Davos. Finnish President Alexander Stubb suggested Europe “unequivocally” could defend itself without America. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who recently announced the European Union will be a “military powerhouse,” talked up Europe’s independence. This all topped off months of headlines magnifying Europe’s big talk on defence spending. The problem is that none of this is true. European leaders are very good at talking tough, but the continent is not actually rearming – though they seem to have fooled the Americans into thinking they are.

President Donald Trump campaigned on forcing Europe to pay more for defence, and initially, it seemed Europeans had listened. EU leadership came up with a promising proposal: “Rearm Europe,” which they claimed totalled just over €793 billion ($940 billion) in new spending. But the details revealed the actual spending was much lower: Roughly €143 billion ($170 billion), with the rest being merely a suggestion for member states to increase their own budgets. Then, some national leaders suggested “Rearm” was too violent, leading to its current technocratic name, “Readiness 2030”.

This was followed by June 2025’s NATO summit, where member states promised to spend at least five per cent of GDP on defence (3.5 per cent on “core military expenditures,” 1.5 per cent on “security-related spending”) by 2035. This came after months of being harangued by the United States; President Trump called the agreement “a big win”.

The agreement was clearly a success. But celebrations may have been pre-emptive. Spain already said it will not significantly increase spending. And other member states have creative ideas regarding what’s considered military spending. Italy argued a bridge to Sicily is “security-related,” only backing down due to American pressure; undoubtedly, countless smaller “security-related” projects will fly under America’s radar. And “core military expenditures” are not just guns and tanks: In Germany, they included millions spent on unusable 3D printers.

Berlin is a particularly galling example of overpromising. Last June, Germany’s government said they would reach the 3.5 per cent mark by 2029. The media bought it: The Atlantic heralded the coming of “the New German War Machine,” while others called the undertaking “stunning.” Politico already declared Berlin’s “rearmament upends Europe’s power balance.”

But there is no such rearmament. Germany’s military spending only cracked two per cent of GDP in 2024 (along with a majority of NATO member states), just high enough not to be critiqued by the then-incoming Trump administration. And last November, Germany’s defence minister announced the country would not reach 3.5 per cent by 2029 after all

America’s European allies spent the last decade warning of World War III. “It’s 1938” has been repeated ad nauseam. But Germany, Italy, France, and others are waiting half a decade or more actually to spend enough to ward off such threats.

In 1940, America spent roughly two per cent of its GDP on defence. Two years later, with the advent of the world war, that jumped to over 16 per cent. If a country wants to quickly increase spending, it can do so – there is nothing requiring anyone to wait. Europe’s flagship programme shouldn’t be Readiness 2030 – it should be Readiness 2026.

So why are they waiting?

The answer is politics. Coincidentally, 2029 is when Trump’s term expires, and when Merz’s own term ends; 2035 is even further off. Increasing spending will require deeply unpopular cuts to Europe’s welfare state; by convincing Washington their promises are serious and giving President Trump the veneer of a win, those cuts can be put off and their political careers can avoid injury. In a best-case European scenario, Trump will be followed by an Atlanticist president, and Europe won’t have to truly increase spending at all.

There is cause to suspect Europe is trying to sidestep the issue. In late 2025, the Trump administration moved less than one thousand troops out of Romania, a natural first step for a long, measured American pull-out from Europe. But the move triggered alarm bells across the continent, as it was proof that America was serious about leaving a gap that European leaders never had any intention of filling.

Last week, it was reported the Pentagon will withdraw even more troops. But the total number is roughly 200, and withdrawal will take years. This is far too slow and will give Europe even more of an inflated confidence that they have pulled the wool over America’s eyes. European capitals will be happy to have America continue to subsidise their defence, saving Europe’s bloated social safety nets. Instead, the United States should continue to pull soldiers out, and at a faster pace.

Europe’s verbiage has generated great coverage, but it’s just been cover for inaction. If their tough talk is anything more than just talk, they should be glad to pick up the slack.

Anthony J Constantini is a weekly columnist for Brussels Signal (brusselssignal.eu). He is a policy analyst with the Bull Moose Project in Washington.