Germany can no longer afford purity: Berlin reroutes to Russia

When Friedrich Merz speaks twice of reconciliation with Russia shortly after a strategically important visit to India, it is not a slip of the tongue. It is a signal. The richest country in Europe and the EU’s industrial locomotive seems to be reconsidering both its bitter animosity toward Moscow and its self-destructive, short-sighted alignment with Beijing.

Germany has spent the past three years presenting its Russia policy as both a moral imperative and a strategic necessity. Sanctions were meant to break Moscow. Energy disassociation was framed as liberation. Economic pain was justified as the price of defending values. Yet none of this has delivered the promised outcome. Quite the opposite.

Russia has not collapsed. Its economy has adapted. Its trade has found new partners. And Europe – Germany above all – has absorbed the costs. German industry is struggling under high energy prices, shrinking competitiveness, Chinese antagonism and slowing growth. The geopolitical leverage Berlin expected never materialised. Instead, Germany finds itself weaker and more exposed.

Now, something appears to be changing. Merz’s remarks do not amount to a hic et nunc policy reversal. They may not be a peace offer. But they hint at a growing recognition inside Germany’s elites that the current state of affairs has reached its limits. Confrontation without an endgame in sight is no longer a viable strategy.

The timing matters. Merz has just returned from a high-profile official visit to Delhi. Berlin seems to have acknowledged that India is not merely an alternative market or supplier – it is becoming central to Germany’s strategic thinking exactly because of China.

For years, Berlin built part of its prosperity on deep economic integration with Beijing, treating China primarily as a commercial partner while downplaying its authoritarian policies, scandalous competition practices and geopolitical ambitions. This is collapsing. China is no longer just a difficult partner. It is a systemic rival and an emerging strategic threat to European interests.

German companies face mounting pressure in China: Forced technology transfers, market restrictions, political interference and growing unpredictability amidst unethical competition shape a difficult relationship. At the same time, Beijing’s alignment with Moscow, its assertiveness in global institutions and its willingness to weaponise trade have fundamentally altered the risk factor.

Germany is waking up to a dangerous reality: It has tied too much of its industrial future to a country whose interests increasingly diverge from Europe’s – and whose leverage over German supply chains has now become profound, as China floods the EU with cheap goods, from clothing and appliances to gadgets and EVs.

This is where India enters the picture. New Delhi offers what China no longer does: Demographic growth and a vast and expanding market, without threatening German companies or demanding political subordination. The world’s largest democracy trades with Russia, does business with the US and deepens ties with Europe all while maintaining its own strategic independence.

In this context for Germany, India is a counterweight. A necessary pillar in any serious diversification strategy away from China. But diversification has limits. Germany cannot break free from China while maintaining a permanent freeze with Russia. Cutting off both superpowers simultaneously leaves Berlin with too few options, too little energy security, and too narrow a strategic horizon.

This is the unspoken logic behind Merz’s intervention. Germany is not suddenly nostalgic about Russia. It reroutes under pressure. It recognises that Washington is already doing what Europe avoids: Adjusting to pragmatic criteria. The United States keeps channels open, manages escalation and makes post-war arrangements. Europe has been moralising. America under Trump strategises. Now Berlin must catch up.

The irony is sharp. Germany followed the most rigid line of transatlantic confrontation with Russia, even as the US retained some flexibility. Meanwhile, China exploited Europe’s strategic paralysis, deepening its economic influence over the Old Continent, while Germany hesitated to confront the threat.

Merz’s remarks suggest a belated awakening: Europe cannot afford purity in a world of competing power centres. Dialogue with Russia does mean a carte blanche to the Kremlin. Engagement is not surrender. And acknowledging failure is not weakness, but the most important precondition of a return to sustainable policies.

The danger for Germany is not recalibration. It is further delay. China is becoming a long-term strategic challenger to German and EU interests – economically, technologically and geopolitically. Countering that challenge requires partners like India. But it also requires strategic room to manoeuvre. Permanent hostility on all fronts is not strength.

So, if Germany is reassessing its approach to Russia, it is not because it has changed its values, but because it has rediscovered reality. The question now is whether the EU will follow, or whether it will cling to slogans while others adapt. In any case, Germany’s shift, if it continues, marks something historic: The end of the illusion that Europe can somehow afford to invoke principles while shooting its own legs.