Public opinion doubts if ‘more Europe’ is the way forward

In Brussels, these are the worst of times, but also the best of times. Donald Trump’s second presidency has undermined the certainties of the transatlantic political and cultural alliance, forcing a rethink of the European Union’s strategic positioning; but according to many – starting with Ursula von der Leyen herself – this situation actually offers an opportunity to build a stronger union, “a new form of European Independence”. In fundamental areas such as trade and defence, the current crisis could provide the justification for creating a stronger supranational structure, in the name of guaranteeing a role for European nations in a world dominated by great power competition.

This is certainly not a new idea. Jean Monnet himself said that Europe would be forged through crisis, and in recent years there have been many examples of this process. During the Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010 to 2012, the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact were introduced to tighten oversight of national finances, and the Covid-19 pandemic led to the implementation of Next Generation EU, fashioned as a common response to an economic emergency.

An urgent question is whether European nations are right to continue along this path, responding to the uncertainties posed by the second Trump presidency with a push for greater unity while seeking to convince public opinion that “more Europe” is in fact the only way forward. In addition, we must ask whether the remedies proposed – greater centralisation and mechanisms allowing the overcoming of unwelcome opposition from voters and individual governments – would actually improve the lives of European citizens, or merely advance a preconceived goal that conceals serious underlying problems.

There is no doubt that Donald Trump’s actions are undermining certainty regarding the foundations of the Western world. From “Liberation Day” to the threat of tariffs over Greenland, from ambivalence regarding the fate of Ukraine to disregard for international law in Latin America and the Middle East, the current White House is nothing if not disruptive of the international order. Yet it is important to distinguish between Trump’s personal aims and exaggerations and the broader change in US policy which has been underway for years. For example, the Biden administration certainly did not step back from protectionism and state intervention in the economy, as demonstrated by the shock of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. And the downplaying of Russia as an adversary began as far back as the administration of George W. Bush, who proclaimed a “partnership” and “alliance” with Vladimir Putin. This was followed by Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” and Biden’s 2021 attempt at a strategic dialogue with Russia – interrupted, however, when more aggressive factions prevailed on both sides.

The fact is that the tectonic shifts in Western policy in reaction to the failures of financial globalisation and the post-9/11 military interventions were emerging well before 2016, when Donald Trump wove the public backlash together with his own brand of “America First”. And those changes represent a major challenge for the EU, whose current structure – after the shift from a “Community” to a “Union” in the 1990s – has been constructed following the very principles of the liberal international order now being called into question, from the globalisation of markets to the assertion of human rights in ways that have often lacked coherent application.

This means that, apart from Trump’s chaotic use of tariffs and his flight forward in international relations, there are serious issues which the entire West must address in order to deal with the ongoing effects of its own mistakes. These include reclaiming political authority over economic processes and implementing effective industrial policies to ensure adequate investment in infrastructure, innovation and advanced manufacturing, as well as rethinking international relations to acknowledge the sovereign rights of new global players, rather than clinging to the notion that liberal views (and at times specific interests) can be imposed through economic coercion and more or less obvious coups in disparate areas of the world.

The European Union has begun to recognise the new reality, but struggles mightily to free itself from the ideology of free-market dogma. The calls for massive investment in innovation and the use of instruments to protect European economies against unfair market practices are welcome, yet the underlying model has changed little. Just consider the new Stability and Growth Pact, a warmed-over version of the same principles, with greater flexibility but also the promise of stronger enforcement. Despite widespread acknowledgement that the arbitrary budget parameters of Maastricht have no validity in the real world, monetarist ideology continues to constrain the productive and social investments that are needed to address economic decline. Furthermore, the political goal of centralisation always takes precedence: Better to force member states to seek approval for spending decisions from Brussels, even if that means much lower efficiency in terms of the amount and timing of funds spent.

On strategic issues, the EU’s posturing is more transparent, but still contradictory. It is right to rebuff Trump’s threats on Greenland, but awkward to assert territorial rights based on the colonial past – and in some cases present – of European powers. The noble goal of assisting Ukraine clashes with a lack of realism regarding a potential solution to the conflict. Russia seeks a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, which the Western world rejects, yet honesty regarding the effects of NATO enlargement and support for regime change operations could provide a more solid basis for a diplomatic solution.

This brings us to the issue of democracy, which Europe claims it is defending. Here as well, contradictions abound. Even without going back to the lack of democratic consultation in the adoption of the founding documents of the EU, there is a clear pattern of setting goals from the top and then using coercion to get member states to follow along, even if voters express a different preference. From pressure on eurosceptic parties to growing censorship of individual citizens who express divergent views under the Digital Services Act, it is becoming harder to reject the criticism that Europe is downgrading democratic values in the quest for greater cohesion. The justification of fighting the bad guys rings hollow when considering the contradictions recalled above, from failed economic policies to new forms of colonialism. Given this picture, it would seem smarter for European nations to more clearly define their goals based on the true interests of their citizens before rushing towards a centralised superstate.

Andrew Spannaus is an American journalist and political analyst based in Milan. He has written extensively on populist movements in the US and Europe, and lectures on US economic history at the Catholic University in Milan. He is a radio host and podcaster for Radio24, and a frequent commentator on international politics in Italian media.