New investigations show that European technology continues to fuel Russia’s military capabilities in Ukraine, despite numerous European Union sanctions.
Components from major EU manufacturers are finding their way into Russian drones, missiles and tanks through shadowy supply chains, underscoring the challenges in enforcing export controls.
One journalistic cross-border investigation has revealed how advanced European components continue to bolster Russia’s drone arsenal in Ukraine, circumventing EU sanctions through opaque third-country networks.
Despite export bans since 2022, high-priority tech from EU firms is reaching Moscow, enabling mass production of Geran-2 kamikaze drones – rebranded versions of Iran’s Shahed-136 – used in devastating strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
The probe, revealed today and involving Belgian outlet De Tijd, The Times, The Irish Times, Der Standard, InfoLibre, Paper Trail Media, the Kyiv Independent, and the NGO Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), analysed Russian customs data and drone wreckage.
Close to half of the components in Geran-2 drones were found to contain foreign products, with many microchips and antennas hailing form the US, Europe and China.
Around 112 components per drone come from the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany.
These parts were exported to Russia after the sanctions were put into effect.
Journalists identified components from 19 European manufacturers, including Irish firms Taoglas and TE Connectivity for antennas and connectors, UK hardware for electronics and an Austrian sensor for navigation.
Thousands of units, produced as recently as 2025, have been shipped via intermediaries in Hong Kong and China, with values running into tens of millions of euros.
The companies say they did not want the components to reach Russia but it was out of their power to control what their clients do.
Follow the Money (FTM), a Dutch investigative platform, today highlighted a different report, by the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) Foundation. This exposed Hong Kong shell companies as key conduits for dual-use goods such as semiconductors and processors from EU giants including STMicroelectronics.
These companies also said they followed the sanctions but were unable to control what happens after the products left their sphere of influence.
More than €190 million worth of European components reached Russia via Hong Kong in the first two years after the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, CFHK found.
These evade controls by rerouting through non-sanctioning jurisdictions, as highlighted by analyst Lucas Risinger of the Kyiv School of Economics, who criticised western enforcement as “insufficient” amid gaps in global co-ordination.
Sanctions tend to falter because they target single entities rather than corporate networks and enforcement has largely ignored the banks, logistics firms and service providers that underpin the trade in restricted goods to Russia, according to CFHK.
It also pointed out that many components produced by European-headquartered companies are often actually made in factories across Asia.
Samuel Bickett, a lawyer and author of the report for the US-registered NGO involved in the investigation, said: “None of Ukraine’s allies are implementing effective sanctions.”
EU officials have tightened rules, sanctioning evasion networks and expanding dual-use export bans. Experts, though, warn that without stricter third-country oversight, Russia’s war machine will keep exploiting these vulnerabilities, potentially threatening European security.
COMMENT: Russian resilience is not the result of superior Russian economic policy. It is the result of European incoherence, writes @Raphfel. https://t.co/8AO7FpcEkE
— Brussels Signal (@brusselssignal) November 27, 2025
