Brussels set a new standard of brutality in Hungarian campaign

The hotel where I’m staying in Budapest is dominated by journalists and election observers. It’s hardly surprising – it’s affordable yet comfortable, and well-connected. But at breakfast,I also spotted three acquaintances – election campaign experts from various European countries, constantly travelling the campaign trail. These spin doctors (of the Dock Morris type, who secured a second term for Clinton) told me over coffee that they were moved, because the Hungarian campaign had set a new standard for electoral battles. “Never before have external forces intervened so openly and on such a scale in an EU country. And successfully, which they will interpret as an encouragement to continue,” they told me, shaking their heads, excited by the new trend in the industry. They finished their coffee and set off on the trail.

Hungary and Europe were left with the change that had taken place. I struggle to write that this was the Hungarians’ choice. Formally it was, but it was made under immense pressure from the long-standing blockade of European funds, and even the participation of young people in the Erasmus programme, constant accusations and lectures. And finally, there were also the recordings of the foreign minister leaked into the campaign, made by European intelligence services with the help of an opposition activist who passed on his phone number. The Hungarians resisted this pressure and manipulation for a very long time; but every society has its own pain threshold and limit of endurance. Orbán’s opponents had more money, resources and time.

Orbán lost, of course, for purely external reasons as well. The key factor was the public’s weariness with a single team having been in power for 16 years. In Poland, after eight years of either Tusk’s or Kaczyński’s governments, the feeling emerged that it was too long. The Hungarians, however, are more composed; for historical reasons, they are better able to function within institutional frameworks, so they were not quite so impatient. A long period in power also means mistakes and blunders that accumulate and eventually build a grand coalition for change. Prime Minister Orbán could have prevented this as recently as two years ago, for example by replacing key politicians within his own camp. But he did not decide to do so, or perhaps he could not. And then it was already too late.

Fidesz ran a dynamic campaign, full of ideas and vigour. Orbán went out into the field and galvanised his camp. But perhaps the others were already complacent? Perhaps for activists in key positions, this campaign was merely an unpleasant interlude between Easter and the summer holidays?

On election night, sadness reigned at Fidesz headquarters. I saw people devastated, I saw people crying. I even had the impression that a tear had welled up in Prime Minister Orbán’s eye. Or perhaps I was imagining it. Certainly, Fidesz had hoped for more, at the very least a narrow defeat. Magyar, however, secured a constitutional majority. And he can do a great deal; he can change not only people but also the rules of the game. His post-election speeches suggest that the promised revenge against Orbán’s team remains the government’s fundamental plan. If we take his promises seriously that he will model himself on Poland, the Hungarian independence movement faces hard times of persecution and repression.

At this difficult moment, Orbán did not turn his back on the people. Greeted with surprising enthusiasm, he congratulated Péter Magyar with class and announced his continued service to the country. But no concrete plan could be discerned from this. The people I spoke to on the ground reckoned that Fidesz would probably try to return to its roots – hard work on the ground, building a grassroots structure. That is how it began its march to power.

There will be no other option, anyway. Tisza took everything it could and will try to strip the conservatives of all their institutions, structures and resources. In terms of the number of votes cast, it doesn’t look quite so bad, but translated into seats, it gives it 138 seats in parliament, compared to 55 for Fidesz. The results from the single-member constituencies were decisive, where Orbán’s party usually received a hidden bonus. This time, that mechanism worked in the opposition’s favour. Added to this was the appearance of 600,000–700,000 new voters in the election. That is why polls close to the opposition suggested a dead heat, treating such a high declared turnout – almost 80 per cent – as wishful thinking. And that is also the reason why Fidesz people are so surprised by the result. Right up to the end, they hoped it was the so-called “silent Fidesz voters”, mobilised by the risk of losing stability. It turned out, however, that it was the anti-Orbán campaign that mobilised them.

Fidesz faces a tough time ahead. If we go by the Polish experience, the first three months to six months are the hardest. That is how long the new government’s honeymoon lasts. After that, voters start asking for results. Given the diverse coalition Magyar has built, united solely by their aversion to Orbán, this will be difficult. And the camp itself may start to crack sooner than we think.

Returning to the hotel from election night, I saw young people waving flags, cars honking in greeting, and two girls next to me taking a Tisza poster from a street pole as a souvenir. I wonder how many months it will be before they hide it under the wardrobe.

After all, no one has ever denied the radical Tisza economic programme that leaked to the media. And they certainly turn their noses up at cheap Russian oil, too. For many rejoicing today, this may be a bittersweet joy. Undoubtedly, Hungary is losing its unique international standing, which, thanks to Orbán’s talent, rose far above its actual strength. It will once again become one of the small countries of Central and Eastern Europe, devoutly awaiting instructions from Brussels and other major capitals.

But for Europeans who want a continent united as a community of sovereign states rather than a homogenised entity governed by people never elected by anyone, the negative consequences have been obvious from the outset. The EU elites may view the change in Hungary as a window of opportunity to accelerate integration, without asking the nations for their consent.