When a party loses an election, they usually seek to determine what went wrong, almost inevitably coming up with two solutions for the next one: Back off or double down. The Republican Party went with the former after losing the winnable 2012 presidential election, releasing the Growth and Opportunity Project, which called for being more welcoming to Hispanics and embracing demographic changes more broadly.
Other times, parties double down. In 2019, the United Kingdom’s Labour Party determined that they had not been affirmatively left-wing enough, doubling down on a raft of progressive promises.
Both efforts failed. In 2016, Donald Trump took over the Republican Party and won the presidential election on a promise of building a wall across the southern border; eight years later, he won on mass deportations. Jeremy Corbyn was crushed in 2019, punished by voters for going too far Left. Five years later, his successor as Labour leader, Keir Starmer, won on a blandly centre-left platform.
Which brings us to Sunday’s calamitous election, which saw Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz fall to Tisza’s Péter Magyar.
There are a litany of reasons why Magyar won, and nailing down a single cause would be difficult, particularly for those who have political biases and will seek to cast the election results in a way which satisfies them. The most likely “single cause” – Fidesz had already won 16 years in power and had simply gotten too comfortable at the wheel – will likely please no one and will therefore not really be considered by the mainstream press.
There is one thing which will be unduly blamed: Orbán’s creation of international right-wing networks. These networks were wide-ranging and incredibly impactful; after President Trump first left office, Hungary offered a home for exiled conservative thinkers. Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Danube Institute and more were able to help centralise and accelerate the mid-2010s civilisational reawakening which had occurred simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic but had not, until Orbán, come together into any real force.
Both Magyar and Brussels have reasons to cast blame on Orbán’s projects. Magyar has already promised to investigate Orbán’s use of funding for these projects, and has specifically said he would seek to retrieve funds which have been used; that will guarantee him a mallet with which to whack Orbán for years. It is an open question as to how successful he can be here, as many of these organisations have outside funding sources. However, with his constitutional majority, Magyar will have an easy time bending to the law to his will.
Brussels will undoubtedly cheer his demolition of Orbán’s project, as Budapest had genuinely begun a Western reawakening. As opposed to the Eurocrats and liberal internationalists, who use Western civilisation as a skin suit to hide a progressive agenda, the ascendent nationalists genuinely have fought to bring back traditional Western values and to recognise international reality (multipolarity). By tearing apart Orbán’s projects, they clearly hope to slow the nationalists’ progress.
This comes at a particularly dangerous time for both nationalists and liberal internationalists. While the latter are down, they are far from out (as Hungary’s election result shows). President Trump’s 2024 victory and his dismantling of USAID and other liberal internationalist programmes was severely injurious to their movement, but they still are showing electoral strength and can reverse their losses with an American victory in 2028 and a few strategic victories around Europe. And while the nationalists are still ascendant throughout Europe – currently polling as one of the most popular blocs – they still have yet to capture major capitals including Paris, Berlin, Vienna, or London, and have lost ground in Poland (though saved themselves with now-President Karol Nawrocki’s win in 2025) and now Hungary.
The nationalist Right cannot allow the complete destruction of the Western civilisational project. Too many connections have been made and too much success has been achieved to allow these networks to whither.
There are a series of steps which will need to be taken for the nationalist right to continue in strength – specifically, two: Fortification and dispersion.
First, Budapest should not be abandoned by the nationalist Right. Magyar will inherit a concerning economic situation and is likely to give way to Brussels on a variety of issues, all of which could make him unpopular and cause schisms to widen in his coalition, which was held together entirely by dislike of Fidesz. Magyar will seek to make life as difficult as possible, but operations in the country should continue to the greatest extent possible. This will help Fidesz maintain an appearance of outward strength while internally reorganising (both of which are crucial, as Magyar must be kept to a single term). But it will also keep Budapest alive as a critical node in the Western nationalist landscape.
However, this loss underlines a painful lesson: That putting all of our eggs in one basket was a mistake. As such, the second step is critical: The nationalist right must also disperse itself and create institutions throughout the West. Right now, Hungary is the only node. That must change.
Many capitals have next to no nationalist organisations present; those which are present are too elite-focused and have done little to try to create a broader movement. Organisations similar to MCC and the Danube Institute could flourish in places like Vienna and Rome. Poland’s Nawrocki is a young and likable and has already run organizations in the past; he should put out a welcome mat in Warsaw, or another city in Poland, for like-minded nationalists. It is there, after all, where the populist wave arguably began, with Law and Justice’s PiS; there being no Western nationalist organisational presence in Poland is a serious oversight.
Vienna, or a city nearby in Austria, should also play a major role in these efforts. The Freedom Party has led in Austrian polls for nearly four years running. While the party has not been active in outreach, there are many individuals around them who have. Just as the Central European University went to Vienna, it would behove some who are in the Western nationalist movement to find a new home in Vienna for the next few years. Its centrality at the centre of Europe’s “wheel” allows for easy transportation to and from, as does its history.
This dispersion would also allow nationalists to group themselves a little better. Poles, for example, had a tough time accepting Orbán’s willingness to talk to Russia. A dispersion allows for more nationalists to come to the table in varying configurations, depending on what a given conference or publication is centred around.
It would also help nationalists learn how to gain power. Ten years ago, the idea of nationalists capturing most of the major Western capitals was a fever dream. Now, it’s reality: By the end of the decade Washington, London, Paris, Vienna, Rome, Warsaw, Budapest, and more could all be under the control of nationalist politicians. Some already are, meaning that those who have won can share ideas on how to actually govern.
By fortifying the movement in Budapest while spreading it around elsewhere, the creation of Western nationalist nodes can help keep the right’s hopes alive. Losing Budapest was a deeply unfortunate setback. But there are always losses in politics, and it was always going to take at least twenty years – representing an entire generation – of sustained efforts truly to change Western civilisation.
These labours began in earnest in 2015. Which means the second half is only just getting started.
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