Europe’s choice: win with Trump or “die” alone

“Man’s soul is immortal, his salvation is in the next world,” Cardinal Richelieu once said; “the state has no immortality, its salvation is now or never.” That great architect of French power in the 17th century and father of the modern state system, Richelieu, understood the fundamental truth of international politics: that states can die and disappear as sovereign actors – and today, this would include supra-state constructs like the EU. 

There is no natural law that says states must exist forever purely on account of their “virtue”. Hence Richelieu’s concept of raison d’état with its imperative to do whatever it takes, in this life, to save the state. Judging by their first reactions to Trump’s election – which comes exactly 400 years since Richelieu’s own ascent to supreme power – this is an insight that the Europeans, with their usual mix of arrogance, delusions of moral superiority, lack of self-awareness and rank incompetence, seem to have forgotten.

Europe on the precipice

This is the most dangerous moment for the “European project” in its short history so far. If not handled well in terms of establishing a positive relationship with Trump 2.0, it can lead to its demise in relatively short order. Europe – and by that I mean principally the EU – was already staring into the abyss even before November 5th, when everyone was assuming a Harris victory and more or less a status quo in relations with the US. 

Europe can barely keep its nearly “net zero-growth” economy above the waterline, at 0.9 per cent. Its bloated welfare states and runaway health costs, coupled with vast levels of debt and deep deficits, give it little room for fiscal adjustment – unless radical cuts are implemented, which is impossible politically at the scale and speed required. The money is simply running out, and borrowing more – to cover, for example, major increases in defence spending – raises the risk of inflation, if not hyperinflation when servicing the debt becomes too expensive. 

European economic competitiveness has also been well and truly destroyed in recent years, firstly by regulation and protectionism which have made Europe an “also-ran” in the global innovation and technology race. But secondly, European competitiveness has been given the coup de grâce by extremist “green” policies – which, coupled with the war, have led to industrial-production electricity prices between two to four times as high as those faced by non-European competitors. The key indicator of Europe’s economic health is of course Germany, but the latter’s own economic model is now widely acknowledged as broken. The country is de-industrialising rapidly, largely as a result of extremely expensive energy, with its famed auto companies literally beginning to close shop.

Beyond economic failure, two other spectres haunt the capitals of Europe. One is the irrepressible rise of the pan-continental “hard right” political opposition to the Ancien Régime formed of the old EU loyalist system-parties that still hold sway in most countries. The onward march of these anti-establishment forces is fuelled to a large extent by the same types of concerns that won Trump his re-election: from the scourge of third-world migrant inflows, to woke-liberal and “net zero” extremism, to the economy. The inability – often, unwillingness – of the Euro-elites to deal with these issues is only breeding more dissent.

This year’s EU elections confirmed this trend, as did the Dutch elections and Macron’s foolish gamble. Germany will be next, with its February 2025 early election lining up as another very possible political shock (courtesy of AfD) on the back of worsening economic conditions and rampant immigration. The crushing MAGA victory in the United States will only redouble the energies of Europe’s insurgent movements and ensure that, in any scenario, political stability will be the last thing coming to the continent in 2025 and beyond.

The defence problem

Finally, the most important and pressing problem for Europe is that of defence. There are two aspects to it. The first is the continued ability to support Ukraine’s war effort, which almost all European leaders consider – rightly or wrongly – to be essential to their countries’ security interests. Of course, the issue is that the majority of the key military aid to Ukraine is provided by the US. 

In three years of war, European countries have failed to truly put their defence industries – let alone their whole economies, as once called-for by Macron – on a “war footing”. Defence spending is still nowhere close to what is required to replace US aid as some are suggesting; and even if suddenly the money would be made available, it would take many months, perhaps years, to increase the output in order to create a sustainable European-only military supply-chain feeding the Ukrainian war machine while also replenishing Europe’s depleted stocks.

The second aspect is the imperative of strengthening Europe’s own defences, beyond what is being sent to Ukraine. Putin might win his war there, and – the popular thinking goes – he might then be ready to attack NATO itself within three to five years. As I explained previously in the Brussels Signal, “an adequate European-only defence that can achieve rough parity with that future Russian threat will likely require, very roughly, standing up at least 20 new fully equipped brigades (150,000 troops), and a rigorous programme of upgrading and exercising the existing c.113 brigades spread across Europe.” Expensive and difficult as this sounds, it is worth noting that this assessment assumes that the US would still continue to remain at least a formal NATO member and to maintain its nuclear umbrella over Europe, even if it would reduce its troop levels in the region and not send reinforcements in case of war.

It thus becomes apparent that on both these counts – military aid to Ukraine and the ability for self-defence against a potential Russian attack on NATO – Europe is critically dependent on the US. It would take several years – likely well beyond Trump’s new term of office – to build up the production capacity and battle-ready capabilities to eliminate those dependencies, even if the money and industrial power (in a de-industrialising Europe) were available, and even if the crucial problem of recruitment among European populations were to somehow be overcome. And then there would still be the question of European nuclear deterrence against Russia – certainly in terms of maintaining a strategic nuclear balance – which is unanswerable without the US remaining fully engaged in NATO. 

A dangerous game

In these conditions of much greater European weakness and vulnerability today compared to 2016, it is more than surprising that some of the reactions to Trump’s second coming have been so ill-judged. Leaving aside Macron’s calls for more “autonomy”, which are simply not credible anymore after being voiced for years with no effect, and which are unrealistic (as described above), the really dangerous post-election talk has involved suggestions about the Europeans looking to act against Trump, before he takes office, and to try to box him in – especially on Ukraine. 

The other day, Donald Tusk suggested creating a kind of “inner alliance” on Ukraine, a coalition of countries that would be willing to break ranks with the NATO consensus and with America’s wishes, and escalate the nature of their aid to Kyiv beyond current agreed limits. This has been presented squarely as a way to undermine any moves by Trump to initiate a peace process with Russia that, in the eyes of Poland, Britain, and other stalwart backers of Ukraine, would “weaken” Kyiv and be detrimental to its interests as they see it. Even more extraordinary has been recent reporting by the UK press that the British PM, Keir Starmer, is plotting ways to “thwart” Trump’s ostensible Ukraine policy before it even takes off.

European fears that Trump might seek to bring the war to a close quickly and on very different terms than Zelensky’s (completely unrealistic) ten-point “peace formula” are perhaps well founded. But Ukraine has been on a losing path for a while, with Biden still in office; and negotiations were already increasingly likely even if Harris had won. The opportunity to turn around the war, with Europe getting serious about rearming and supplying Ukraine at much greater scale alongside the US, has been squandered. Now it is too late, not least because of Ukraine’s manpower problem. Trying to force Trump’s hand on this issue, to try to pre-determine his options before he even takes office, and to break NATO consensus in the meantime by creating mini “coalitions of the willing”, is the absolute height of foolishness.

The fact is that Europe had every chance to get its act together in recent years, but failed to do so – whether on defence after 2022, or on the economy, energy, immigration or the other issues that have now become chronic. Aside from the Russia problem, it is now caught, weak and vulnerable, between an American rock and a Chinese hard place. It cannot hope to fight a trade war with Trump and survive; nor can it turn to China – if that even crossed anyone’s mind – as some kind of alternative. On the contrary, Trump is likely to force Europe into a harder stance on foreign, security and economic and relations with Beijing. 

On the all-important aspect of defence and Ukraine, Europe is playing with fire by trying to cut across Trump. This will only empower the many influential MAGA voices around Trump that have long argued for a US withdrawal from NATO, or at least a troop drawdown in Europe. Any of that would be catastrophic, and – there should be no illusions about this – Europe would have no answer in such a crisis. It can’t even deal with smaller problems at home. 

Blue or Red

Europe now has to make the most important choice in a generation. It can choose to take the “blue pill” and somehow “resist” Trump, in a hostile manner, whether on Ukraine, environmental policies, trade, tech regulation and so on. This may allow some leaders on the old continent to feel good about themselves. But Europe’s troubles can easily magnify to breaking point if the Europeans purposefully get on the wrong side of Trump’s America. Down this road there is only more instability, and potentially war and the destruction of Europe – at least in political terms – as it antagonises its most important ally.

The other choice – the “red pill” – would involve the application of Richelieu’s raison d’état, by putting cold-eyed long-term self-interest, and the survival of the European project, ahead of the emotional and “moral” urge to “stand up” to the next US president. In this alternative future, European leaders would make a top-level decision to work with Trump to the fullest extent possible and to comply with most of his demands in all fields. 

This will not make Europe weaker, but stronger, by strengthening the vital bond with the United States – which, under Trump, will very likely increase its power regardless of what Europe does. Yes, compromises will be required, including on Ukraine and perhaps on some rather “sacred” principles of the EU – but many compromises are already crowding on Europe’s horizon anyway, because of internal political pressure if nothing else. 

By embarking on a very different course of action than at present, and offering a sincere partnership with Trump – while being prepared to bear the required costs – the European project can gain a new lease of life, and be part of America’s winning team in the great geopolitical showdown against the Eurasian Axis that is coming in the next few years. Because, make no mistake, a new age of US dominance is only just beginning.

Gabriel Elefteriu is deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and a fellow at Yorktown Institute in Washington, D.C.