In the onslaught of speeches, statements, and executive actions undertaken by the Trump administration, it is understandable that some in Europe may have missed Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearing, undertaken in the first week of the administration. There, Rubio argued that the international order is now “a weapon being used against [the United States].”
This comment, already an excellent, one-line summary of the Trump administration’s view of the world order, became newly relevant after last week’s disaster of an Oval Office meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Donald Trump, where Zelenskyy – for reasons still unclear – decided to pick a fight with Vice President JD Vance. In the wake of that disorder, Europeans were shocked, uncertain as to why the Trump administration would be trying to position itself as separate from Europe; as President Trump said, “I’m not aligned with anybody.”
But the truth is, this should not have been a surprise. The Trump administration is utterly uninterested in holding up the liberal international world order, which Rubio and other members of the administration have lambasted. It views the world order as multipolar, and is seeking to balance in that brave new world against a Chinese pole. It is concerned about the Russian pole, but not nearly as much as China’s. While Russia can threaten Europe – at least, eastern Europe – it cannot militarily threaten the United States, short of a nuclear war which no one is interested in.
If Europe wishes to convince the Trump administration to remain active on the continent, they need to argue – even if they find it distasteful – in the context of this multipolar world order, not in the context of the liberal international world order of the post-Cold War era. While convincing the United States to stick around will be tough, there are a few paths Brussels could pursue.
Firstly, they should be far more willing to be tougher on China. The first administration had to push for years to get Europe to reduce China’s production of key 5G infrastructure; though Europe eventually bent, they did not entirely ban China from building it, and it took years of American complaints.
This should never have happened. The notion of China building sensitive 5G technology – key to communications across the continent – is one which should have been rejected immediately; the United States should not have had to bring pressure to bear. Likewise, over ten European Union member states have signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative; while some – namely Estonia and Italy – have left, it is still far too many. China is not partaking in the Belt and Road Initiative out of its own goodwill; it is doing so to buy up critical infrastructure and influence. America believes that China will be its greatest adversary in the 21st century, or at least for the next few decades; and it already felt frustrated defending Europe from Russia while Europe bought Russian gas. The Trump administration will likely not want to repeat that arrangement, just swapping Russia for China.
Brussels also should cease its targeting of American tech companies, especially over free speech restrictions. This is not to say that Brussels and national capitals need to let tech companies do whatever they wish – but from a purely political perspective, is it truly wise to go after a platform like X, which is owned by one of the American president’s top advisors? This example was specifically given by Vice President Vance. Why would the United States want to continue to defend something which is constantly going after it?
Especially when it comes to the reasons it is going after things like X. Europe is not targeting X due to some sort of some gigantic tax evasion issue: they are targeting it due to speech concerns. This is not over terrorism – it is a complaint over X’s “toxic content,” specifically its failure to target disinformation, which has become the establishmentarian byword for “information we disagree with.” Vance specifically called out the law which has allowed these investigations, the Digital Services Act, in his speech at Munich last month.
Finally, in a broader sense, Europe should consider pulling back on their speech restrictions and other violations of liberty. If they want the United States to stand with them in supporting democracy, they should start by allowing it to flourish at home. The Romanian government’s decision to target Călin Georgescu – the beleaguered presidential candidate who won the first round of his country’s election, only to have the country’s establishment-friendly Supreme Court annul the results – went unnoticed by the Biden administration, but further efforts to target his run will likely be received negatively by Trump. Especially given the fact that the main claim against him – that Russia had organised online supporters on TikTok – turned out to be somewhat false when it was revealed that an establishment centre”-right party had in fact paid to boost Georgescu, not thinking he could actually win.
Similarly, using the police to target those who commit wrongthink should end. High schoolers in Germany should not be taken out of school by police for posting pro-AfD memes, and people in Britain should not be arrested for silently praying in the wrong spot, or even in their own homes.
There will undoubtedly be complaints about sovereignty violations here: why should Europe have to change its internal policies to satisfy America? It’s an understandable question. But during the Cold War, there was a rationale for America’s defence of Europe: the global tide of communism needed to be held back. But now, there is no tide, and – in the Trump administration’s view – Russia can only militarily threaten eastern Europe, and it is not exporting anything ideology-wise which threatens the US. Which means Europe will have to make it worth America’s while to defend it. And that means standing firm against China, ceasing the relentless targeting of American companies, and actually living up to the democratic values they claim to want to defend.
US does not want to defend Europe any more, but Europeans say ‘Ho-hum’