Goodbye, now-former German chancellor Scholz!

Olaf Scholz’s tenure as chancellor of Germany has come to a close. His time in office will be remembered as a period marked by crisis management, cautious leadership and a struggle to assert a clear political identity amid global upheaval.

Taking office in December 2021, Scholz, a Social Democratic Party (SPD) MP, led the first so-called left-wing “traffic light” coalition at the federal level, uniting the SPD, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

His coalition’s ideological divides — between the left-leaning SPD and Greens, who favoured increased spending and the fiscally Conservative FDP — created persistent instability, undermining his ability to project decisive leadership.

Global events quickly shifted the government’s focus.

Barely two months into his chancellorship, Russia invaded Ukraine, forcing a dramatic shift in Germany’s foreign and defence policy.

Scholz coined the term “Zeitenwende” (historic turning point) to describe Germany’s response: A €100 billion defence fund, increased military spending and a decisive move away from Russian energy dependence.

While his government did eventually deliver weapons to Ukraine and reduce reliance on Russian gas, Scholz was often criticised for being slow and overly cautious in his decision-making.

Scholz’s response to the Ukraine war drew sharp criticism. His initial Zeitenwende speech promised a bold shift in German defence policy. His refusal to supply Taurus missiles to Kyiv, though, was seen as a retreat from these commitments.

Germany did provide significant aid including Leopard tanks but Scholz’s cautious approach, driven by fears of escalating NATO-Russia tensions, was seen as dithering.

This frustrated allies and fuelled domestic discontent; observers said his indecision weakened Germany’s international standing.

Scholz’s China policy further exposed his perceived weakness. He advocated “de-risking” over “decoupling”, aiming to reduce Germany’s economic dependence on China while maintaining trade ties.

His controversial 2022 Hamburg port deal, allowing Chinese firm COSCO a stake, angered Greens and the FDP, which feared security risks. Many saw his policies as a naïve misstep, arguing he prioritised economic interests over strategic concerns, especially given China’s ties to Russia.

His 2023 China visit, emphasising dialogue, was seen as too soft, with critics noting Germany’s slow progress in diversifying supply chains.

Scholz sought to position Germany as a stabilising force in Europe, navigating complex relationships with the US, China and European Union partners. Yet his foreign policy was often seen as reactive rather than assertive.

On climate policy, Scholz’s coalition prioritised ambitious “green” goals, aligning with the Greens party push for renewable energy and net-zero targets.

Measures included expanding wind and solar, phasing out coal by 2030 and promoting electric vehicles.

These plans, to many, were seen as poorly executed though. High energy costs and reliance on gas imports, exacerbated by the Ukraine war’s disruption of Russian supplies, burdened German consumers and industry.

The FDP’s resistance to costly “green” subsidies further stalled progress, while Scholz’s compromise on LNG terminals alienated environmentalists. His climate agenda, while bold on paper, was seen as faltering under economic and political pressures.

Economic stagnation, migration challenges and infrastructure decay compounded Scholz’s woes.

Temporary border checks failed to curb populist gains from the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing populist BSW. By early 2025, the SPD polled at a dismal 17 per cent.

Scholz’s robotic “Scholzomat” persona and inability to unify his coalition cemented his weak image, leaving Germany poised for the incoming CDU-led government under Friedrich Merz.