Germany isn’t really going to rearm

Europe’s push to rearm has run into a series of snags. First, the European Council was not so interested in Commission President von der Leyen’s €150 billion ReArm Europe plan, even though, in terms of actual new spending, it was less than €86 billion. Then, there were issues with the nomenclature: Multiple leaders expressed concern with the seemingly violent name of a rearmament campaign. As a result, it was changed to Readiness 2030. This entire process has taken nearly a year, and the €150 billion has still yet to be unlocked. All of this is to say that – beyond the cheerleading on X, accompanied by declarations that now the EU will build its own army – no real military spending is forthcoming.

Not to worry though: If you go by the press, Germany is picking up the slack. The country’s spending “upends Europe’s power balance,” according to Politico Europe. The Atlantic highlighted “the new German war machine”. When discussing Chancellor Friedrich’s Merz’s “fantastic start,” The Economist said that Germany “can now start to rearm to a level where it can play the full part in the changed landscape of European defence.” A Bild report revealed that “hundreds of thousands” of jobs will result with German rearmament.

The problem is that this is all untrue and overstated.

Firstly, the details of what has already been announced are rather unimpressive. Firstly, Germany is planning on spending 3.5 per cent of its GDP on defence…in 2029. The pledge is extremely politically convenient: It’s close enough to seem realistic, but far enough away – likely coming into effect after the next German election – so the current government does not actually have to do anything to make it happen. The “hundreds of thousands” of jobs claim comes from a study which actually held that 144,000 jobs would be obtained in Germany if every NATO member state increases to 3.5 per cent, an eventuality which will literally never come to pass (not even addressing the suspiciously-specific number they found).

Secondly, Germany is starting from an incredibly low floor. In 2023, Germany spent 1.6 per cent of GDP on defence, a paltry sum far before what was supposed to be NATO’s 2 per cent minimum. In 2024, that percentage had risen just enough to hit the 2 per cent mark. The result is that Germany’s army is thoroughly underfunded and unprepared. Even if they do truly ratchet up their spending in the coming four years – which is, again, no certainty – a lot of that is simply going to have to be spent on, essentially, repairs. It’s akin to a thin, unhealthy man seeking to become like Arnold Schwarzenegger. He can do it, sure, but it’ll take a lot longer than it would have taken someone who was already physically fit and knew his way around a gym.

Which takes us to the broader concern: The context in which this is occurring. Even with the money, Germans are not willing to fight – literally. In a 2024 Gallup poll, a majority of Germans (and Europeans as well, which is an entirely different problem), 57 per cent, said they would not be willing to fight in a war for their country. Fully one-fifth of German’s population is immigrants, with most of those recent arrivals coming from the Middle East.

But the issue is not just with migration. It is also with the German native-born youth, who have rallied in protest against a new announcement from the German government: That they will have to answer a questionnaire. The German parliament barely passed a new conscription law. But the new conscription is not a draft: It is entirely voluntary. All 18-year-olds, men and women, will have the option of signing up for the armed forces. They just have to answer a short survey which will be mailed to them.

This is what has caused strikes and marches across Germany: Answering a survey. The German public is so far removed from the idea of being a military power that a majority do not wish to fight for their country and don’t wish to answer a survey about it.

The political context also is a problem for those who believe Germany is going to become great again. The government, like Austria’s, is a ramshackle coalition of parties that do not like each other (the centre-right and the centre-left), who only formed a government in order to ensure that the second-place populist-right AfD (now polling first place AfD) was kept out of power. Even with that, they barely have a majority: Only 12 seats keep them in power. Out of 630 total seats in the Bundestag, this is a tiny majority. And already, it has run into problems, only passing a parliamentary bill with the abstention of The Left, a radical left party, over the dissension of conservative lawmakers who believed that Germany’s pension plans are unsustainable.

Some establishmentarians – though notably, not Merz – have floated banning the AfD to solve the crisis. But AfD voters are some of the more patriotic Germans; banning their votes likely will weaken any desire to get them to pick up a rifle in defence of the homeland.

Which, they are. Germany likely does not have the money to pay for its pensions and an increased military budget without either raising taxes significantly or without cutting services – the latter of which would engender even larger protests.

A shaky political system, unpatriotic youth, a burgeoning and non-assimilating migrant population, and funding problems. This is not an impossible situation to solve. But it will take more than just brilliant policy-making. It will also take a leader who can inspire Germans to be patriotic again. But can such a leader exist in modern Germany?

We may soon find out.