It is not an accident that the man most likely to replace Keir Starmer as British Prime Minister is Andy Burnham, the directly elected Mayor of Greater Manchester. Such is his myth and reputation, built on a perceived decade-long record of delivering some improvements in local government and public services, that he is now known, at least in Labour circles, as the “King of the North”. We live in an age when, more than ever, the political classes are discredited by their broken promises and the increasing prevalence of parliamentarians with no real-life work experience beyond politics itself. So, leaders who have demonstrated they can do something – anything – in practice, even at the head of some kind of a sub-national authority, tend to have an advantage with voters exasperated by the run-of-the-mill politicians who believe in nothing and can only offer more empty words and slogans.
Boris Johnson followed a similar path: His tenure as Mayor of London (2008–2016) strengthened his national name recognition and gave him a power base that ultimately propelled him to Downing Street. But none of this is new, of course. Jacques Chirac used 18 years as Mayor of Paris (1977-1995) as a springboard to the French presidency. José María Aznar was provincial president before becoming Spanish Prime Minister. Germany has a strong tradition of state (Lander) premiers or big-city mayors – from Adenauer and Brandt to Kohl and Scholz – moving to the Chancellery. At the other end of Europe, Romania’s last three presidents were previously mayors; and the runner-up in Poland’s presidential election last year was the mayor of Warsaw. Even Vladimir Putin’s early power base was rooted in St Petersburg networks, where he served as deputy mayor.
The path from local government – or, for wider applicability, “sub-national” power – to the very top of a country’s political system is, therefore, well trodden. But we tend to discount the extent to which it is turning into the main route to supreme power, or the ways in which it is competing with national power to begin with. The fact is that in the 21st century the lower levels of government are growing in influence, legitimacy and resources while central administrations are increasingly failing.
This is one of the most important structural tensions that modern states – irrespective of their outlook on the democratic-authoritarian spectrum – must resolve soon. It is also one that receives comparatively little attention, as such. Certain types of pundits may obsess over supranational projects and schemes – such as the EU’s ever-closer union or ideas like CANZUK – hoping to bring whole states into new consortia, on the assumption that great “blocs” are required in order to compete effectively in a world dominated by the US and China.
But the real – and perhaps more desirable – shift in political power is heading in the opposite direction: Downwards from state-level authority to sub-national leaders in charge of provincial governments or great municipalities. The dream of re-creating imperial-sized entities may continue on paper, but the harsher reality is that larger polities, today, only compound the problems of managing complex modern systems at vast scale. National-level dysfunction is spreading, and across this landscape of growing failure and frustration some of the only good news in terms of governance and things like public service performance comes from sub-national authorities.
Budgets tell their own story. Again, it’s the trend that counts. Sub-national governments (regions, states, provinces, cities and combined authorities) now account for roughly 40 per cent of total public expenditure and 55 per cent of public investment across OECD countries. This share has risen steadily over recent decades. In many unitary states, the increase has been even sharper thanks to deliberate devolution. Over the past 30 years, for example, California state spending grew 2.5 times from about $51.4 billion (€44 billion) in fiscal year 1990-91 (about $131 billion or €113 billion in today’s money, adjusted for inflation) to over $300 billion (€258 bullion) in 2025-26.
In Britain, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA, the “King of the North’s” realm) started life in 2011 with a budget of just over £200 million (€231 million) and responsibility over only a few key functions including elements of transport. Today, 15 years later, its finances have expanded dramatically by a factor of 10, with its remit now extending across transport, skills, housing, police functions, and more.
The same dynamics are at play in non-democratic countries like China, where Guangdong province alone generates GDP equivalent to a mid-sized G7 economy (over $2 trillion in recent figures, or €1.7 trillion), while provincial Party Secretaries in Shanghai, Jiangsu or Zhejiang wield budgets and patronage networks that dwarf many central Chinese national ministries.
To understand why this trend towards devolution of power – or, rather, the empowerment of sub-national structures – will only deepen in future, it is worth looking at some of the key forces fuelling its momentum. The first is urbanisation and economic concentration, with the world now being majority-urban. Major metropolises and their surrounding regions – London, Paris, New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, São Paulo – function as de facto city-states. Each is more like urban powerhouses with a country, or at least a large part of one, attached to itself, than vice-versa. National economies increasingly depend on the innovation, investment and tax bases of these hubs. At the same time, central governments increasingly struggle to manage this complexity, and increasingly fail at the task.
The second propelling force of sub-national power is deliberate decentralisation and democratisation, which continues and remains a live policy issue. Since the 1980s, roughly two-thirds of countries have increased the scope and power of regional authority. In democracies this took the form of elected mayors, devolution deals (Britain), or stronger Lander (Germany). In authoritarian systems it has been a pragmatic process, such as with China’s post-1978 “federalism with Chinese characteristics” which empowered provinces to drive growth. Even in Putin’s Russia some regional governors (e.g. Kadyrov in Chechnya, Minnikhanov in Tatarstan) and mayors (e.g. Sobyanin in Moscow) remain influential regional governors despite the Kremlin’s strong centralising tendency.
Thirdly, there is the governance overload that is increasingly impairing central governments. Modern problems – from housing, transport, skills and climate adaptation to migration integration or economic development – are hyper-local in their effects yet national in scope. Central bureaucracies find them too complex to coordinate uniformly from the top. Sub-national leaders can experiment, compete and tailor solutions faster.
Again, this has nothing to do with regime types. In the US, governors of California, Texas or Florida often matter more on key policy files than many senators. In France and Germany, some regional presidents and big-city mayors are national heavyweights – like Edouard Philippe in Le Havre, the possible next president of France; or Markus Söder of the CSU in Bavaria. Meanwhile, as mentioned, in Russia and China control of places like Moscow, St Petersburg or Guangdong offers massive political leverage.
The future of politics may well become increasingly tied to big-city and regional dynamics. If “follow the money” is a good rule in this field as in others, it does appear that further devolution of power to sub-national levels is likely. Breaking up bigger problems in smaller chunks that are amenable to more localised and focused solutions – not least through the increased competition that would result – is perhaps one of the best ways to address some of the most pressing public concerns across modern societies. Capital flows will reward well-run places, and local power-bases will form the basis for national influence more often.
The struggle between central control and decentralisation will be determined not by ideological “debates” but by real-world demonstrations of what works. Would-be “saviours” of nations should focus their efforts at local and regional level and build solidly for the future; that is where the political battle will be won.
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