Cost-benefit of European mass migration: mostly just crime and billions spent on welfare

We need to redefine the term terrorism. After 9/11 a common assertion was that, while terrorism certainly is tragic, the risk of dying in a car accident was still significantly higher than in a terrorist attack. Twenty-three years have passed since Al-Qaeda attacked the United States, and despite the threats made by the late Osama bin Laden and his followers, there has been no other attack of such dimensions. Yet somehow the sense of insecurity has not disappeared, and as it turned out violent terrorism is only a symptom of a much broader issue.

The comparison with traffic accidents was always frivolous. Accidents are by nature tragic because nobody involved wants them to happen. Even reckless drivers or careless car manufacturers do not intentionally plan to kill people, and if it happens, they do not celebrate it. Therefore, most people accept the risks of traffic as an acceptable trade-off compared with all the benefits that modern transportation entails. Although accidents involving cars could be brought down to zero via banning cars, nobody would seriously entertain such a measure. The conveniences brought by the automobile far exceed our fear of the risk that also comes with it.

In Europe, a growing number of people is now asking which conveniences have been achieved by mass-immigration from non-Western countries, and what are the countervailing benefits that justify the ever-growing risks that come with it. A cost-benefit analysis of the kind of migration Europe is experiencing at the moment reveals that it is almost all cost, with hardly any benefits. 

Over the last ten years the number of knife attacks has increased by 50 per cent in Germany. Compared to their share of the population, foreigners are six times more likely to be the perpetrators. When it comes to sexually motivated crimes that number rises to seven times more likely. Wherever data is collected, the same pattern emerges: African and Middle Eastern immigrants have the highest rates of criminal offenses. According to data from Sweden, 58 per cent of men convicted for rape or attempted rape are foreign born. Pointing out that mass migration from non-Western countries has led to a deterioration of the quality of living in many Western countries is neither populist nor hyperbolic, but simply a statement of fact. 

This kind of migration is not just lowering overall security, it is also a huge burden for taxpayers. Jan H. van de Beek, a Dutch mathematician, scrutinised migration in the Netherlands, producing some sobering insights. His data reveal that the government spent about €17bn annually on migration from 1995 to 2019. This sum breaks down to more than €1bn each month over those years.

Van de Beek’s study boldly ventures into a controversial area by differentiating between Western and non-Western immigration and examining their economic impacts. He found that the cost of predominantly non-Western immigration reached €17bn per year, while immigration from Western countries actually generated a surplus of approximately €1bn. If migration levels from 2015-2019 persist, the fiscal burden is projected to rise from €17bn in 2016 to about €50bn, a surge likely unbearable for the welfare state. Contrary to what open border enthusiasts are telling you, mass migration will not be the saviour of the welfare state, but the final nail in its coffin. 

Similar dynamics are observed across Europe. The Danish finance ministry discovered that non-Western immigrants are more prone to remain lifelong welfare recipients compared to native Danes and Western immigrants. In Germany and Austria, the pattern is comparable. Around 45 per cent of unemployment benefit recipients in Germany are non-citizens, costing taxpayers roughly €20bn per year. The Turkish community, comprising 1.4 million people and over two per cent of the German population, often shows poorer performance indicators compared to their German peers. They experience higher unemployment rates, tend to retire earlier, and rely more heavily on government benefits. Austria’s data echoes this, with nearly 60 per cent of state benefit recipients having a “migrant background.” 

More importantly, however, than the economic data is the growing stress on social cohesion and increased levels of anxiety within the population. For example, a high ranking member of the German police said after the Solingen knife attacks that from now “everyone has to decide for themselves whether they go to festivities, to football matches, or are on public transport.” In other words, what once were mundane parts of daily life, are now risky undertakings as the state has all but given up in its obligation to protect its citizens.

But it gets even worse. Why, for example, did the foreign ministry of Germany instruct its embassies and consulates in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria that they should issue visas even if applicants had no or clearly forged documents? Why would the German government actively encourage migration from the very parts of the world that are overrepresented in crime statistics? The answer to this question appears to be that parts of the German establishment care more about foreigners than about their own people. Such an attitude, however, will come at a cost – and the first part of the bill will be due this Saturday at local elections, where the AfD most likely will succeed with major gains. If you think that an AfD chancellor within the next 10 years is an impossibility, you might be surprised.