Europe cut out of the negotiating table, and no one who matters cares

Europe no longer has a place at the table. It is that simple. At the time of writing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are negotiating in Saudi Arabia about the future of Eastern Europe. There is a lot of huffing-and-puffing about this in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin but no one who matters really cares. 

Trying to build a counterweight to the United States, French President Emmanuel Macron called a meeting of – according to French sources – the “main European countries.” This group includes France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Britain, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark as well as the NATO secretary-general and the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. Why, at a time when unity is needed, the man in the Élysée Palace decided to further divide Europe by creating “main” and “not-so-main” countries is a mystery. Not surprisingly, members of the latter club are quite upset. The Czech Republic and Romania are two of the strongest supporters of Ukraine’s war effort, and the leadership in Prague and Bucharest is befuddled as to why they did not get an invite. Hungary, the much scolded “black sheep” of Europe, went a step further, describing the meeting in Paris as a gathering of the “losers’ club.” Realising his mistake, Monsieur Macron has now rushed to convene a second emergency meeting, including additional EU member states plus Canada. The growing inability of the European Union to even coordinate a meeting without causing diplomatic tensions speaks volumes, and it reveals that despite all the talk of unity, countries like France or Germany are attempting to use the EU as a vehicle for their own ambitions. 

The worst comment, however, came courtesy of the current President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen: “Europe’s security is at a turning point.” No, that turning point happened three years ago, but unfortunately almost everyone in Europe refused to turn. Let us a take a look at a counterfactual history about what should have happened in 2022 but unfortunately did not. We are in this mess because the likes of Macron and von der Leyen took us there. Here is how things could have gone differently. 

When Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine, a few things became imminently clear. Russia is Europe’s main energy provider, and Moscow will use this as leverage as far as possible. In 2021, Russia supplied 47.9 per cent of coal imports, 40 per cent of consumed gas, and was the largest supplier of petroleum oils to the EU with a share of over 20 per cent. The reason why all these imports are needed is because Europe barely produced any energy on its own. By the most diligent calculations, the EU’s share of global oil production is under 0.4 per cent. In terms of natural gas, this figure stands at just 2.3 per cent. Regarding coal, the EU accounted for 309 million tons of the total 8,057 million tons produced worldwide in 2021, representing only 3.8 per cent of global production

Europe is, in other words, an energy dwarf entirely depending on the rest of the world for its needs in this regard. This condition, by the way, has not changed as a consequence of the war. According to a recent headline in the Guardian, in 2024 the EU spent more on fossil fuels from Russia (€22 billion) than it gave to Ukraine in aid (€19 billion). The apparent delusion by European policy makers that platitudes can replace access to resources collided with reality on day one, but from Portugal to Poland almost everyone decided to ignore it or make it worse. Alternatives, of course, would have been possible. On day one after the invasion in 2022 the European Union could have developed a Japan-style strategic energy plan, taking into account the numbers I presented above as well as the changed geopolitical situation. 

Then the EU should have advised its member states to issue emergency moratoriums on any proposed closures of strategic energy sources. The two first items on that list would have been the Groningen Gas field in the Netherlands (the largest natural gas field in Europe) and the 25GW of power provided by Germany’s nuclear power plants. Alas, we all know what happened: Groningen was shut down in 2024, and the German power plants in 2023.

Another step could have been to demand an end to fracking bans in France, Germany, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands and instead incentivise cooperation with the United States in order to move as fast as possible with exploiting Europe’s shale reserves. In the same directive, Norway and the United Kingdom should have been asked to increase their fossil fuel production to feed the required industry for a prolonged conflict with Russia, especially if the latter is supported by China. Of course, none of these steps was taken either.

Finally, the Europeans should have put together a massive re-industrialisation package, incentivizing heavy industries to stay and expand production in Europe. During war, the length of supply lines matters and relying on US shipments from energy (in the form of LNG) to tanks was always a recipe for losing this war. 

A military conflict is the application of energy on the battlefield and in the economy – for “financial services” are less needed than steel and aluminium. Ukraine needed tanks and ammunition, both things the Europeans promised, but could not deliver. This war was always going to be won by those who got the energy question right. Unfortunately, the Russians did, while the Europeans did not. And Ukraine is now paying the price.