The Soviet Union erased Russia’s history as a European cultural nation

A crucial rule of successful diplomacy is that one does not have to approve of one enemy’s actions, but one does have to understand what motivates them. Misreading Hitler’s intentions in the late 1930s or Stalin’s intentions in by the mid-1940s was part of the reason why World War Two broke out and then led to over 40 years of the Cold War. The same holds true regarding the West’s approach to Hamas and the broader Middle East. The goal of Hamas is not a two state solution and the emergence of friendly Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the Palestinian question is not the most pressing issues for countries like Saudi Arabia, who prefer to pay lip service to the “Palestinian Cause” while their true interests are economic growth and counterbalancing Iran. The key to understand Donald Trump’s success with the Abraham Accords is to realize his ability to look beyond the headlines towards what truly motivates the actions of his opponents. The often-used label “deal maker” is nothing but another term for “diplomat.” 

The same approach will be necessary when dealing with Russia: As I wrote initially, understanding what motivates Putin is not the same as approving of his actions, but in order to come to a stable conclusion of the war, everyone needs to walk away believing that they won. I am a strong proponent of Henry Kissinger’s claim that “for nations, history plays the role that character confers on human beings,” and only if we understand the character of our opponents can we come to lasting agreements. I am not claiming to be an expert on Russian history, but I do believe that those who are would agree that one cannot understand Moscow’s current polices without taking history into account. Vladimir Putin is known for his long excursions into Russian history at every occasion, and while we might disagree with his perspective, obviously history matters a lot to the man in the Kremlin. The great scholar of literature, Gary Saul Morson, has written a wonderful book on the relevance of 19th century Russian writers for the current world. While reading the book, one starts to see the tortured nature of Russia’s relations with the West, something worth exploring in greater detail.

Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy are the pinnacle of Russian literary achievement, and it is no exaggeration to say that in the whole of literary history, few reach the level of these two giants. But Dostoyevsky’s relevance is not limited to the 19th century; it also concerns current relations between Russia and the West. One of the most important themes of his novels is the complex relationship between rationality and morality, emotion and calculation. In Crime and Punishment, Dostoyevsky develops his most important philosophical argument, namely that human existence cannot be reduced to a machine-like maximisation of utility. In The Demons, he describes how Tsarist Russia is attacked from all sides by new ideologies, and how various -isms from nihilism to socialism vie for the Russian soul. While the age of reason was celebrated in European salons, Dostoyevsky saw what was forming in the shadow of modernity: political religions and the seeds of totalitarianism that would engulf Europe and the world in the years following his death with industrial-scale mass murder on an unprecedented scale. As his Russian compatriot and Nobel Prize winner for literature, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, once noted: “It seems as if Dostoyevsky alone foresaw the coming of totalitarianism.”

And here is Dostoyevsky’s contemporary relevance: although he was a Russian author, his thinking and understanding of the world was deeply influenced by the European Enlightenment and the contradictions of modernity. The problems he addresses also occupied the French novelist Gustave Flaubert – who was also born in 1821 – in his book Madame Bovary. Likewise, Tolstoy’s War and Peace and, in particular, Anna Karenina are not just dusty old novels, but complex examinations of the upheavals caused by a rapidly modernising Europe. It is a shame that Russian literature occupies such a modest place in the Western European school and university system, as a better understanding would be highly relevant to current politics towards Russia.

Although Russia has occupied a special position since tsarist times due to its history and sheer geographical size, the country’s elites were difficult to distinguish from Western European nations in their cultural make-up. But in other areas, too, the country underwent a development that was mirrored in the rest of Europe. In the 19th century, the importance of religion declined and was replaced by growing nationalism, industrialisation, ethnic conflicts, the desire for more political participation of a growing bourgeoisie – all this took place everywhere in the West, from Washington to London, from Vienna to Berlin.

The actual breaking point of Russia with the West happened with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and it is this date that still hangs like a sword of Damocles over any actual rapprochement between Russia and the West. It was the creation of the Soviet Union that erased Russia’s history as a European cultural nation. A country that produced Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky, whose Empress Catherine maintained a lively exchange with the Enlightenment philosophers Diderot and Voltaire, became a Gulag state and one of the first totalitarian experiments.

To this day, Russia suffers from the bipolarity of its history, which is why it sees itself as both a European and a non-European country. Even worse, the Soviet Union has succeeded in its historical memory in achieving what was denied to ‘European’ Russia: the rise to become the absolute superpower during the Cold War. What makes the situation even worse is that Russia’s perception in the rest of the world is still too strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. With few exceptions, knowledge about Russia in the Western political and university landscape begins with Lenin and Stalin, while the European period is almost completely ignored. Those who continue to negotiate with Moscow as if it were still the USSR should not be surprised to receive a post-Soviet foreign policy in return. A rapprochement with Russia would have to take place primarily in the cultural sphere, reminding Russia’s elites that their future lies in the West, and not in an alliance with China that has already failed once. Emphasising shared historical experiences and recognising Russia’s cultural achievements would be confidence-building steps that would resonate particularly strongly with a nation plagued by self-doubt.

Although the conflict in Ukraine will eventually reach a resolution, the West must avoid repeating past mistakes in its approach to Russia. To effectively address Russian aggression, the West needs to learn from its previous errors rather than duplicate them. One crucial mistake the West must learn from is its persistent tendency to view Russia as merely a smaller version of the Soviet Union. This perspective is flawed because it overlooks the pivotal role that the Russian people played in dismantling the USSR, highlighting that “Russian” and “Soviet” are not interchangeable terms. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the perception of Russia as merely the successor of the Russian Revolution of 1917 should have changed. Europe and the U.S. should have fostered the development of a Russian identity that was independent of Lenin and Stalin, enabling Russia to evolve economically, socially, culturally, and politically.

This wouldn’t have been difficult. Despite their differences, Russia should not feel alien to the West, as we all value her contributions to Western civilization, from Tchaikovsky’s piano concerts to the realist novels of Tolstoy and the literary brilliance of Dostoyevsky.

Identity plays a significant role in international politics, and the West should have encouraged a shared identity based on common values within Russia. Instead, the ongoing estrangement between Russia and the West during the 1990s led to a distrust that caused Moscow to view NATO and the EU as threats. One concerning indicator of underlying issues was the consistent polling that showed Stalin becoming the most popular historical figure in Russia, reflecting a stark contrast to the early 1990s, when attitudes toward him were largely negative.

While a more positive approach wouldn’t have resolved all differences with Russia, a Russian Federation that recognized its role within Western culture and civilization would have been less frequently antagonistic for Realpolitik reasons. This shift could have facilitated finding common ground, particularly in addressing issues like the situation in Ukraine. What is needed in the West is a period of introspection on how to guide our Eastern neighbour back onto the historical path of Westernization that was violently disrupted in 1917. Failing to do so risks the current conflict being merely the beginning of ongoing tensions.