It is not every day that a country stands up to the People’s Republic of China, particularly one as small as Lithuania. But Lithuania has, in the past five years, thumbed its nose at China on a variety of issues. In 2021, the small Baltic nation banned “unreliable” manufacturers from its 5G markets, a shot at China’s Huawei. That same year, it also allowed Taiwan to open a representative office (a step down from a formal embassy) which included reference to it being “Taiwanese” (oftentimes, such offices use “Taipei” to avoid angering China). This prompted China to downgrade relations with Lithuania, and to impose trade penalties. Chinese ships, along with Russian-flagged vessels, have also partaken in apparently cutting undersea cables around the Baltics.
But now, the country’s government has reversed course, with Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas seeking to restore relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Part of this is simply due to a change in government: Paluckas’s centre-left party won over the centre-right in last year’s elections, and new governments usually mean new policies. However, there is likely another reason Paluckas may want to reverse course: he has received virtually no help from Brussels against China.
Yes, the European Commission formally took China to the World Trade Organisation over their trade imposition, but everyone knows that China would not actually adhere to WTO rules if they lost the case. Likewise, commission President Ursula von der Leyen mentioned China’s anti-Lithuania policies in a few speeches years ago, but failed to do much since. The EU did not even see the WTO case through until the end, quietly dropping the case at the last minute, earlier this year. Lithuania had signalled during the case that China had somewhat relented, which may have given the EU a reason to back out. But it is impossible to imagine that the Chinese would have relented at all unless they imagined the EU would stand with Lithuania throughout the case. At the same time, the European Commission is seeking trade talks with China, and will be hosting a major summit with the Chinese in July.
This is both more perplexing and significantly larger than just Lithuania for many reasons, but one in particular stands out: standing up to China is one of the easiest ways for the European Union to get back in the good graces of the United States.
It does not take a political analyst to grasp that the Trump administration is upset with the direction the European Union has taken. President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised Europe for not spending enough on defence and, rather than take it seriously, most European countries have shrugged the administration off. When Vice President JD Vance spoke at Munich and urged Europe to cease attacks on free speech – explicitly linking that to further American support – establishmentarians were mortified at having been criticised.
Instead, European leadership has continued as if the Trump administration is a passing fad and that they can, somehow, go back to the turn of the century when America was content to defend Europe, so long as the latter looked away from the former’s military adventurism. The fact that Vance, who may be even more sceptical of defending Europe than Trump, is the president’s near-certain heir has somehow not made them any more quick to seek to get themselves out of the jam they are in. If they wished to, though, standing with the United States against China would be a good place to start.
It would fit Europe’s beloved morality-based foreign policymaking. Last year, the European Parliament adopted a report calling for the defence of “universal democratic values and principles.” The report called for standing against “populism,” apparently a large threat to democracy. But there’s good news: China, as one of the greatest authoritarian threats on the entire planet, is a much larger target. One would think it would be easy for the EU to start there.
It would also match with Europe’s geostrategic needs. Europe obviously feels threatened by Russia – but working with China, and strengthening their economy further, simply strengthens the Russo-Chinese bloc which has developed over the past four years. China has also been a major supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine, something which Europe should – if it takes itself seriously – condemn.
Detaching from China economically would also strengthen Europe in the long run. Yes, in the short term such a shift would be difficult. But Europe should learn the same lesson the United States has learned: it is economic and geopolitical malpractice to rely on one single authoritarian country for medicine, chips, rare earths, and more. By moving away from China, the European Union could prepare themselves for a multipolar world in which China will have vastly more power. Relying more on itself – or on other partners – would also bring European Union member states closer together more organically, instead of a top-down approach favoured by Brussels bureaucrats.
And of course, it would win plaudits in the United States. Furthermore, it would make it easier for those in Trump’s movement who believe ties with Europe are important to make an affirmative case for those ties to those who are more sceptical.
Prime Minister Paluckas has said that he would be open to sending an ambassador to Beijing if China sends one to Vilnius, though he tempered that by saying, “it doesn’t mean we’re going to make any sacrifices.” But it is impossible to imagine that China would simply send an ambassador without demanding some sort of favour in return. Brussels should encourage Lithuania to stand firm – and in doing so, should find some backbone of its own.
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