Punish Conservatives, reward Tusk: What EU calls ‘rule of law’ in Poland is political

Tusk and von der Leyen, perhaps she is telling him how whatever his government does, or doesn't do at all, is going to be considered 'rule of law' by the European Commission. (Photo by Pier Marco Tacca/Getty Images)

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The European Commission has published its latest report on the rule of law in Poland for 2025.  Previous reports were highly critical of Poland and served as a ruthless tool of political pressure. Brussels’ attitude towards Poland over the last decade has been largely based on political pressure through systemic questioning of the rule of law in Poland, which has significantly weakened our position both within the EU and vis-à-vis our international partners in general, and served as a justification for blocking EU funds due to Poland.

However, the new report is different. The 2025 report is full of smooth words about great changes and steps in the right direction, even though they are only planned steps. As soon as the political option preferred by the Brussels elite came to power in Poland, the EU ceased to see any violations of the rule of law in Poland, and the European Commission almost immediately unblocked the first funds for Poland’s National Recovery Plan.

Today, when comparing reports on the rule of law from the time when Poland was ruled by the more conservative and more sovereigntist Law and Justice government and the latest report published during the EU-backed left-liberal government of Donald Tusk, it is really very hard not to see the flexibility that the European Commission has given to the definition of the “rule of law.”

The EC’s 2025 report is full of claims about “significant progress” in Poland in various areas, which later in the report turn out to be progress in the form of promises, announcements or declarations by the current government that it is “starting to address the issue.” 

By praising Donald Tusk’s government for its alleged intention to separate the functions of the Prosecutor General from the Minister of Justice, the European Commission is clearly turning a blind eye to the unlawful replacement of the National Prosecutor and the takeover of the Prosecutor’s Office by Tusk’s government—an issue widely discussed not only in Poland. The role of the National Prosecutor is specifically designed to ensure that someone other than the Minister of Justice has direct supervision over the work of prosecutors in Poland, which is why the President’s approval is legally required to dismiss or replace the National Prosecutor.

In January 2024, however, Tusk’s Justice Minister and Prosecutor General, Adam Bodnar, removed the incumbent National Prosecutor without President Andrzej Duda’s approval, installing his own appointee to take control of the country’s prosecution service. The European Commission’s failure to recognise such a blatant interference in the justice system cannot be attributed to ignorance. There can be only one explanation: The EU does not consider violations of the rule of law problematic when they come from a government perceived in Brussels as “pro-EU,” ie, supportive of transferring more power to the EU and aligned with the European Commission’s LGBT, gender, and progressive policy priorities.

The EC report praises the government for “preparing reform plans” for the disciplinary system for judges and the National Council of the Judiciary, noting that “the government intends” to introduce new regulations ensuring greater independence. The problem is that no specific changes have been adopted recently, which again indicates that the EC is “rewarding” the current ruling coalition in Poland for its declarations alone, rather than for actual actions.

An objectively prepared report on the rule of law should certainly include the bill announced by Minister Bodnar and Prime Minister Tusk in September last year, which would allow for the vetting of approximately 3,500 judges in Poland, with the possibility of their removal or demotion, in violation of the Polish Constitution. However, there is not a single sentence on this subject in the EC report.

As pointed out by the Ordo Iuris Institute in its amici curiae opinion on the arrest of Father Michał Olszewski and in its opinion on the detention of Dominik B. sent to the National Prosecutor’s Office in Katowice, Donald Tusk’s government is committing serious violations of international standards. In its latest report on the rule of law in Poland, the European Commission, of course, makes no mention of this at all.

Another example is the high-profile case of Marcin Romanowski, a former deputy minister of justice who was granted political asylum in Hungary in 2024 after being charged with corruption by the prosecutors under the control of the National Prosecutor unlawfully appointed by the Tusk government. Romanowski maintains that the charges are motivated by political revenge rather than actual evidence, and he has managed to convince the government of another country of the validity of his concerns, which gives the case a very significant dimension. Despite this, the EC report makes no mention of this event.

The European Commission’s publication, on the other hand, praises Donald Tusk’s government for its “commitment to the fight against corruption” and “plans for further reforms,” even though concrete actions are limited to initiating further proceedings, the political nature of which is widely commented on in Poland itself. 

The recent disclosure of EU funding from the National Recovery Plan for projects that are absurd, grotesque, or even beneficial to people close to members of the ruling coalition—in the context of praise for the fight against corruption—only reinforces the impression of unashamed bias in the European Commission’s report.

Following the publication of the list of beneficiaries of part of the funds from Poland’s National Recovery Plan (KPO), particularly in the context of the relaxation of the criteria for their allocation after Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition and his coalition partners came to power, the manner in which these funds are being distributed raises serious doubts as to their economy and transparency. The criteria for allocating funds have been relaxed by Donald Tusk’s government to such an extent that they constitute a glaring example of waste of EU funds. At a time of such significant financial needs in the areas of defence, infrastructure construction, and economic development, as well as the deteriorating standard of living of the population, such wasteful use of Next Generation EU funds requires a thorough investigation and consequences.

In media pluralism, the Commission’s report on the rule of law in Poland, it noted progress in “media pluralism” and “transparency of media ownership.” However, it pointed to the need for further action on the independence of public media and the protection of journalists.

The report completely omits the controversy surrounding the forced takeover of public media after the appointment of Donald Tusk’s new government on December 13, 2023. Later that month, the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, led by Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, initiated the process of liquidating Telewizja Polska, Polskie Radio, and the Polish Press Agency, appointing temporary liquidators. This process, carried out in a manner raising serious legal concerns, included the forcible seizure of public media headquarters and changes to their management boards without consultation with the National Broadcasting Council, in violation of the Broadcasting Act and constitutional principles of media freedom.

It is difficult to find a more glaring example of a violation of the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law than the forcible takeover of public media without any legal basis. By remaining silent on these events, the EC report seems to sanction actions that in fact undermine the rule of law.

One of the most recent examples of politically biased media is the coverage of the inauguration of President Karol Nawrocki on August 6, 2025. TVP consistently avoided referring to him as ‘president,’ referring to him only by his last name. What is more, the broadcast of the swearing-in ceremony before the Sejm was shown only on the public television news channel, TVP Info, and not on the main channel TVP1 as is usually the case for events of such importance. It is difficult to interpret these choices as anything other than a deliberate marginalisation of the event. In that context, the EC’s claim that the pluralism of public media has improved is not only unfounded but absurd.

This latest report on the rule of law in Poland supports the long-standing view that the rule-of-law dispute is fundamentally political.

It is hard to believe that the European Commission knows nothing about the statements made by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who, in his speech on December 13, 2023, shortly after taking office, said that “we must introduce a militant democracy that will not allow the return of authoritarian tendencies. This requires decisive action, even if it is controversial.” In another speech, on January 15, 2024, he stated that “this is not the time to strictly adhere to the letter of the law when the future of democracy and the stability of the state are at stake.”

The above words, indicating a willingness to act above the law to keep the opposition at bay, are not commented on in any way in the EC report, even though they cast a serious shadow on the Polish government’s intentions regarding the rule of law. As a result, this shadow spreads to the European Commission itself.

The Ordo Iuris Institute has been pointing for years to the need for thorough reforms that will restore the European Union’s shape and meaning as an economic community and a union of sovereign nations. In an era of such great polarisation, not only in Poland but throughout Europe and the world, continuing the centralisation of the EU and attempts to interfere so intrusively in the domestic politics and affairs of EU member states can only end badly for European integration and cooperation.

We are now at a point where the question “Whether and how to reform the Union” should be replaced with “Can the Union still be reformed?”

This is an edited version of a report by Anna Kubacka, an analyst at the Ordo Iuris Centre for International Law