The myth of Turkey as an indispensable bridge between East and West is beginning to give in under the weight of its own contradictions. For decades, the West treated Ankara as a difficult but necessary partner: A massive, secular military power, securing NATO’s eastern flank. But today, under a leadership that looks up to the era of the Sultanate more than the ideals of democracy, Turkey has changed. It is no longer a bridge. It is a geopolitical ferryman, demanding fees from everyone while serving no interests but its own.
This transformation is most visible in the current crisis involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. As Washington and Jerusalem finalise the strategy for a potential confrontation with Tehran’s nuclear programme, Ankara is totally absent from the planning rooms. The Turkish leadership has made it clear that its soil will not be a staging ground for any offensive operations against the Mullahs. In fact, Turkey has positioned itself as a vocal critic of “external interference”, effectively offering Tehran a diplomatic shield while the rest of the West prepares for confrontation.
Is it the animosity toward Israel that has ended up dictating Turkish policy? President Erdogan’s rhetoric has long been serving domestic nationalist consumption. But things with Israel have now gotten close to out of hand. Turkey’s trade boycotts and labeling of regional terror groups as “liberators” have created an unbridgeable rift with Jerusalem. Can a nation that treats the primary regional outpost of the West in the Middle East as a pariah truly be called an ally? The answer is increasingly clear: Turkey’s heart is no longer in the Atlanticist camp.
This pattern of playing both sides is not a new phenomenon. We have seen it manifest itself with devastating clarity in the Ukraine war. While Turkey provided drones to Kyiv, it simultaneously became a primary hub for the evasion of Russian sanctions and a welcoming host for Moscow’s capital. Ankara has indeed mastered the art of “transactional neutrality”, selling weapons to one side while doing business with the other. This double game is not the sign of a reliable partner, but of a merchant power that views global security as a commodity to be traded for own gains.
It is exactly in this context of strategic flexibility that Ankara has been granted a free hand in northern Syria. Exploiting the fluidity of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has aggressively pursued its own agenda, often at the direct expense of Western-backed partners. Through funding and militias, Ankara became a champion of the new Syrian government, trading its cooperation with the right to dismantle Kurdish entities. But even though Turkey is on the same side with the West on this front, Washington is no longer trying to lead it. It is simply trying to manage it.
The Kurdish question remains the ultimate driver of Turkish insecurity. Ankara is haunted by the prospect of Iranian Kurds achieving any degree of autonomy or ethnic recognition in the event of a regime collapse in Tehran. This fear creates a bizarre alignment between a NATO ally and the theocratic regime in Iran. Both powers are united in their desire to suppress Kurdish aspirations, even if it means Turkey must oppose Western efforts to weaken a state that sponsors global terrorism and blatantly suppresses its people. It is an alliance born of mutual domestic fragility.
If Turkey cannot be relied upon in Ukraine and all the way to the Middle East, why should Europe treat it as a vital cog in our security mechanisms? For too long, Brussels has operated under the delusion that Turkey can be anchored to Europe through economic incentives or defence cooperation. But a partner that acts as an unstable factor in every major crisis is surely not a reliable friend. We are feeding a neo-Ottoman ambition that views European security as a bargaining chip, rather than a shared responsibility.
The time has come for a cold, hard reality check — and reassessment. Turkey has chosen a path that only maximises its own hegemony, even if it passes through Moscow, Tehran, Qatar, or any other dubious capital. The US is beginning to realise that such a country cannot be a reliable long-term partner, gradually detaching its energy, trade and military interests from Ankara. Europe, in its turn, must now decide whether it should really entrust anything related to its security in the hands of a party with which it no longer shares cultural values and strategic goals.
As the US and Israel prepare for war, the EU sinks into irrelevance