On Saturday June 27th, the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced he would be stepping down from office and scheduling early elections. For those who might expect Vučić to leave the political scene following months of unending political pressure, corruption scandals and international scrutiny, though, the resignation would appear merely to be intended to move up the political calendar by one year, and making the most of positive polls for Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
It is currently unknown whether the – now lame duck – Serbian President intends to run but while he is ineligible for a third term as President, he could very easily stay on as Prime Minister, were he to win next year’s parliamentary election; or an early one, were the government to resign. In past interviews the resilient politician has never ruled out the option of a swift game of chairs.
Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has been in government for over twenty years and in executive office for over a decade but the contestation to his rule has become more acute of late.
Dr. Andrej Mitić from the civic Dveri Movement believes the Serbian government “suffers from a pronounced deficit of legitimacy” and has “throughout 2025, governed under conditions resembling a state of emergency”.
The Vučić presidency was tainted by the partial collapse of a railway station ceiling in Novi Sad in 2024 which caused the deaths of 16 people. This accident was thoroughly weaponised by the opposition in order to trigger a wave of protests against the SNS government.
Dr. Mitić explains that while “radical symbols, slogans, and songs have been employed, alongside instances of street-level hostility toward government representatives, reminiscent of Antifa-style tactics”, the opposition has aimed at representing a “social catharsis” for Serbian society at large. Indeed, the demonstrators present themselves as a “student-civic protest” and they “appropriate national discourse and symbols, redefining Serbian patriotism within a framework of left-wing ‘constitutional patriotism’. Examples include framing acts like ecological cleaning public spaces as patriotic, carrying Serbian national flags.”
Nevertheless, while less hegemonic than before, the popularity of the government remains high. This, in spite of continued Brussels antipathy towards Serbia’s neutrality and pro-Russian leanings. Many in Serbia have denounced a perceived coordination between the opposition and EU interests, aiming at bringing down the government, mirroring what was achieved in Hungary in April.
Sava Stambolić from the Centre for Social Stability and a governmental advisor, observes that the demonstrations against the Serbian government have not been entirely organic, with “foreign influence being felt during the whole of 2025 and 2026, especially from the European Parliament” and that the biggest cause of instability is the “infrastructure of foreign NGO influence in the judiciary, the media and in politics”.
All pundits agree that Europe is nowhere near seeing the last of the cunning Serbian politician.
