Europe has already committed more than €220 billion to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. That figure matters politically. But it should not decide what happens next.
The harder question is simpler: What will the next euro actually achieve?
Past spending can easily acquire a logic of its own. Once governments have committed large sums, signed contracts and made political promises, continuing can start to feel like the only responsible option. But previous expenditure is not evidence that every future commitment will be effective, necessary or affordable.
What matters now is where Europe can use its limited military, financial and political resources to produce the greatest improvement in security. That is the difference between strategy and sunk-cost thinking.
Russia started the full-scale invasion, and Ukraine has every right to defend itself. Europe also has a clear interest in ensuring that aggression does not become an effective way to redraw borders. But those facts do not answer the practical decisions facing European governments today: How large should the next weapons package be? What should the next loan achieve? What is the purpose of the next sanctions measure?
A fresh assessment could easily justify spending more. If another €10 billion significantly lowers the risk of a Ukrainian defeat, strengthens deterrence or prevents a much larger and more expensive conflict later, then spending that money now may be the cheaper option. But the case has to rest on what the money can accomplish in the future, not on what Europe has already spent.
The Council of the European Union says that the EU and its member states have provided €220.2 billion in support for Ukraine and its people, a total that includes €107 billion provided from or guaranteed by the EU budget and €77 billion in military assistance measures. A further €90 billion loan has been finalised by the Council on April 23, 2026 for Ukraine’s urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027, with an indicative €30 billion for macroeconomic support and €60 billion for defence industrial capacity and procurement.
NATO’s Ankara Summit Declaration, agreed on July 8, 2026, added another indication of the scale of the decisions ahead. Allies pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine in 2026, with a commitment to provide at least the same level in 2027. The declaration also recorded that European allies and Canada now finance the vast majority of security assistance to Ukraine.
These figures should not simply be added together. They come from different institutions and cover different categories of support. But together they show why regular reassessment is essential.
Changing direction, or even asking whether the current approach still works, is not disloyalty. It is responsible policymaking.
Imagine European leaders were making the decision for the first time today. Given the battlefield situation, Ukraine’s financing needs, Russia’s military capabilities, uncertainty about American involvement and Europe’s own defence shortages, what combination of military aid, economic support, sanctions, deterrence and diplomacy would they choose?
If the answer is broadly the policy Europe already has, continuing may be justified. If the answer is different, past spending should not lock Europe into yesterday’s assumptions.
Past decisions explain how Europe reached this point. They do not determine where it should go next.
Europe cannot judge the value of another €10 billion until it says clearly what that money is supposed to achieve. Is the objective to preserve Ukraine as a sovereign state? Restore all internationally recognised borders? Improve Kyiv’s position in a future settlement? Prevent another Russian invasion? Provide long-term security guarantees? Support Ukraine’s eventual membership of the European Union?
These aims overlap, but they are not identical. Each requires a different level of military support, funding, patience and willingness to tolerate escalation. Without a clear objective, policymakers cannot know whether another commitment is producing meaningful progress or simply extending an expensive policy.
The debate should therefore move away from total spending and towards something more useful: Marginal security return. A practical test would compare three broad uses of the next €10 billion.
The first is direct military and financial support to Ukraine. The second is investment in European ammunition production, air and missile defence and other defence-industrial capacity. The third is broader readiness: Logistics, cyber resilience, stockpiles and the infrastructure needed to move and sustain forces across Europe.
Each option should be judged against four questions. How much security is it likely to produce over the next 12 to 24 months? How quickly will that effect appear? How resilient is the investment if American support falls? And does it leave Europe with stronger long-term capacity?
No credible government can reduce these choices to a single score. The point is not to manufacture a perfect formula. It is to force the trade-offs into the open.
Direct support to Ukraine may deliver faster battlefield or deterrence effects while leaving some European capacity shortages unresolved. Industrial investment may strengthen deterrence for years but arrive too slowly for Ukraine’s most urgent needs. Readiness, logistics and cyber spending may have less visible battlefield impact while reducing vulnerabilities across Europe.
The best answer may be a combination of all three. The strongest objection is that these are not clean substitutes. Support for Ukraine can itself buy Europe time to increase production, strengthen deterrence and reduce the danger that Russia eventually tests NATO more directly.
That is true. And it is exactly why Europe should think in terms of sequencing and complementarity rather than choosing one bucket. The real question is which mix delivers the greatest security effect now while building the capacity Europe will need later.
Every commitment also carries an opportunity cost, not only in money but in weapons stocks, production capacity and political attention. The choice is not “Ukraine or Europe”. It is how finite resources should be divided to maximise European security.
The EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, offering up to €150 billion in long-maturity loans for defence investment and joint procurement, illustrates the wider problem. Nineteen member states applied and their combined requests exceeded the available envelope. Supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s own defences are not mutually exclusive, but they compete for industrial capacity, financing and political focus.
And the financial burden will not necessarily end when the fighting does. The fifth joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, drawn up by the Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the European Commission and the United Nations and published on February 23, 2026, estimates that recovery and reconstruction needs could reach almost $588 billion (more than €500 billion) over the next decade, nearly three times Ukraine’s estimated output for 2025.
Europe’s commitment may therefore not end with the war. It may simply enter another phase.
Big geopolitical commitments take on a life of their own. Contracts are signed. Institutions are built. Budgets are adjusted. Political promises are made. Over time, the entire system becomes organised around the existing strategy.
That makes change harder even when the assumptions behind the original policy have shifted. There are at least three kinds of sunk cost to watch.
The first is financial: The belief that Europe has spent too much to change course now. The second is strategic: Military production, planning and institutions become organised around one approach. The third is reputational: Leaders fear that reassessment will be interpreted as an admission that earlier decisions were wrong.
These pressures can make persistence look like strategy. But slogans are not enough.
“Stay the course” is not a strategy unless leaders can explain what the course is supposed to achieve, how long it can be sustained and what would justify changing it. “Seek peace” is equally incomplete unless it explains how negotiations would improve Ukraine’s position and Europe’s security. Both sides should have to state their assumptions, identify realistic alternatives and explain what evidence would change their minds.
Real risk management starts with an uncomfortable truth: Sometimes your assumptions will be wrong. A strategy is only robust if it can survive that. Europe’s policy should therefore be stress-tested against several possibilities.
What if the war lasts much longer than expected? What if American military support falls sharply? What if Europe has to assume a much larger share of Ukraine’s financial and military burden? What if escalation brings NATO and Russia closer to direct confrontation? What if domestic political support weakens in key European countries?
Consider one scenario. If US military assistance fell substantially in 2027, could Europe still finance, supply and politically sustain its current strategy? A “no” would expose a dependency that needs to be addressed rather than left as an unexamined assumption.
Time and funding are risks in their own right. A strategy can be correct in principle and still fail if the resources required to sustain it run out before it succeeds.
Stress-testing does not predict the future. It reduces the chance that an attractive forecast becomes the foundation of a fragile policy.
Geopolitical risk is rarely eliminated. More often, it moves from one place to another. Belgium offers a useful example.
Approximately €210 billion of the Central Bank of Russia’s assets are immobilised in the EU, most of them held in Belgium. Brussels-based Euroclear reported that €202 billion of its €241 billion balance sheet at the end of June 2026 was connected to sanctioned Russian assets, a broader category that includes more than the central bank’s holdings. Related legal proceedings continue: A Russian court ordered Euroclear in May 2026 to pay damages of 18.17 trillion roubles (about €205 billion) and then rejected its appeal, a ruling the company says it does not recognise.
The broader lesson matters. Military assistance can reduce the risk of Ukrainian defeat while increasing fiscal or escalation risks for Europe. Sanctions can impose costs on Russia while also creating legal, financial and commercial exposure inside Europe.
Rearmament means spending more today in the hope of reducing deterrence risks tomorrow. So the relevant question is not merely whether a policy reduces risk. It is where the risk moves, what new dependencies it creates and who ultimately bears the cost.
That belongs inside any serious assessment of marginal security return. Optionality matters too. European governments need enough financial capacity, military resources and political flexibility to adjust when circumstances change.
Agreement among policymakers is not proof that the assumptions behind their agreement remain valid. Before approving another major package, European leaders should answer five questions publicly.
First, what exactly are we trying to achieve? Second, what is the realistic probability of success, and how will we know whether we are making progress? Third, where would the next unit of military, financial or political capacity produce the greatest security benefit? Fourth, how does the strategy hold up if the war lasts longer or external support falls? And fifth, which risks are we reducing, which are we transferring elsewhere, and what would make us change course?
Nothing in this framework automatically points towards a smaller aid package. It may show that Ukraine requires substantially more support and that providing it now is the least expensive way to prevent a wider or longer conflict. The next €10 billion may indeed be indispensable.
Europe could also conclude that part of that money would generate more security by expanding defence production, strengthening air defence or improving military readiness while diplomatic efforts continued alongside military pressure. Both outcomes can be rational.
What matters is that the decision rests on future security, expected costs and realistic alternatives, not on the political or emotional weight of past spending. Reassessing strategy does not erase Russia’s responsibility for starting the war. Nor does it undermine Ukraine’s right to defend itself.
But those facts do not turn yesterday’s expenditure into an automatic argument for tomorrow’s commitment. Europe should not ask whether the last €220.2 billion was justified every time it considers another package. It should ask a more useful question: Where will the next €10 billion produce the greatest improvement in European security?
The last €220.2 billion explains how Europe reached this point. It does not determine the value of the next €10 billion. Sunk costs are not a strategy.
